☼ mylink-anchor: anchor
<see GCW text “Towards a new kind of international alliance” in article “Towards new alliances able to maintain a real condition of Peace”>
<see GCW article “The basic problem: lack of awareness of what a true condition of Peace is“>
inside (3) – B. PEACE ENFORCEMENT PHASE – <see “Post-cold war: the need to define new methods and strategies to maintain or restore peace: peace enforcement phase”> contrattacco
inside (3) <see text “Post-Cold War: New ways of using weapons (local strategies)”>
cap (3) <see text “Post-Cold War: Towards a redefinition of Peacekeeping (and international alliances“)
cap (2) <see text “Post-Cold War: The shift in the concept of war and arms“>
cap (1) <see text “Post-Cold War: Towards a new form of deterrence (beyond the cold war)”> > THE PARADOX OF A DETERRENT THAT IMPLIES SELF-DESTRUCTION > excursus: the paradox of the nuclear deterrent > THE FALL OF THE NUCLEAR DETERRENT TABOO: THE POSSIBILITY OF DEFINING A DETERRENT SUBSTANTIALLY DIFFERENT FROM […]
neutral-countries
1) IT IS NOT THE QUESTION OF A WAR BETWEEN RUSSIA AND UKRAINE, but of how Putin’s “expansionism” (military and political) can evolve (and of “Axis” with China and Iran)
memories of the past have been lost.
inability to evaluate the cost/benefit – immediate advantages are chosen (illusion) unable to see the threats of the consequences..
2) IT CAN LEAD TO A NUCLEAR WAR.
It is therefore necessary to carefully evaluate “what can still be done” (but the problem is that most Nations do not realize that too little has been done, and that the question is the time factor is decisive).
