Ukraine must become an “adult country” in order to be able to deal with other nations as equals

The problem with Ukraine is that it has been (and still is) submissive to the rest of the world in recent decades.

This submissive condition cost Ukraine the unwarranted loss of Crimea in 2014, and Russia’s armed invasion in 2022 (the West was unable to stop Russia’s plan although this plan was evident to many. years). And it is costing Ukraine the impossibility of solving the problem of the Russian invasion correctly (the policies of the West continue to be set up by treating Ukraine as a submissive country, which in any case must at least partially renounce its sovereignty).


Basically today the Western nations that claim – in words – that them want to help Ukraine, actually continue to think about giving priority to their economic interests with Russia, thus creating a strong conflict of interest with respect to their (apparent) defense position of Ukraine.

That is, these nations primarily think of using the occasion of the war currently underway to be able to exploit Ukraine in the future (the most evident case is that of Germany which offers loans to Ukraine, which have the clear consequence of becoming a debt-trap for the latter). [see later chapter “Some clarifications on the two fundamental concepts“ peace ”and“ aid ”(the“ debt-trap diplomacy ”)].



To understand what is really happening in the Russia-Ukraine war (and assess what are the real chances that this war will end properly), it is necessary to understand how the current “allies” of Ukraine are (knowingly or not) creating the conditions for his defeat.

That is, it is necessary to take into consideration the fact that

the work of the “allies” is actually compromised at the root:
them are in a position in which
Putin cannot be allowed to be defeated.

As seen in other GCW articles, the position of such nations is paradoxically obtuse: they do not realize that they are inflicting harm on themselves with their approach. <see GCW text “The obtuseness of the position of the west (in the post-war view)“>


It should be borne in mind that Ukraine’s “allies” are clearly insufficient to defeat Putin’s Russia:

● supplies of weapons have always been below needs: the quality and quantity of armaments shipped until the summer of 2022 cannot in any way allow the war to end. In this way, Ukraine is prevented from defending itself on an equal footing: as we know from experience, it is not possible to wage a war solely in defense, since sooner or later the enemy finds a way to attack in the right way, and win the war.

A war can only be won if it is fought on equal terms with the enemy: Ukraine should be able to fight on equal terms with Russia, using heavy weapons that allow it to attack the strategic points of organization and supply of the army. behind enemy lines.

<see GCW text “The question of legitimate defense“>  

the (political/economic) measures taken to weaken Russia from an economic point of view were insufficient (note that on this level the Western countries should have neutralized Russia even before it implemented the invasion of Ukraine) .

Acting in this way,
the “allies” of Ukraine create a future of endless war for Urkaine.
But also of continuous blackmail by Russia against the entire West.

<see GCW article “The sharp downsizing of post-Putin Russia (Russia will no longer be a problem for the west, but an advantage)“>

The underlying problem: Ukraine which has not yet become an “adult nation”

The underlying problem is that

in the serious problems that Ukraine is experiencing
there is its own strong responsibility.

Responsibility of which Ukraine, if it wants to recover a real condition of Peace, must become aware.

That is, if Ukraine does not start from asking the question “what is our responsibility in everything that is happening?”, it will never really be able to solve its current problems.


Obviously, there is no mention here of the false “responsibilities” identified by a part of Western public opinion, such as the idea that Russia was justified in its aggression because of Ukraine’s request to be defended by NATO; or the killing of Russian citizens in Dombass.


Basically the problem was (and unfortunately continues to exist) that

Ukraine has not yet been able
to present itself to the world
as an “adult nation”

And therefore it has not been able to enter the circle of the “nations that matter”, and to deal on an equal footing with other Western nations.

For this fact, Ukraine is now forced to go cap in hand to the Great Western Powers to pity for help,

Help that will never be given to them
in a substantially effective form
because them see no (substantial) interest in it.

The problem is that this aid will always be, in fact, facade aid, which will never allow Ukraine to free itself from the military oppression of Russia.


The underlying problem of the current situation in Ukraine is therefore that this situation must be changed if it wants to recover the pre-war condition (in the next chapters we will see in more detail how this is possible).


Obviously it is not that other nations can be expected to put the interests of others before their own interests. The question is rather that

Ukraine can show the Great Powers
very valid “interests”
that lead them
to finally support it effectively

The fact is, precisely, that Ukraine must realize that it still has to become an “adult nation” in order to find for itself that place among the “nations that matter” that it has never been granted.

Until that time the international Establishment will continue, as it has done until now, to ignore even the most elementary needs of Ukraine (showing an interest in Ukraine which is in reality a personal interest disguised as solidarity for a People who are suffering serious crimes).

Consider the many aspects in which the West was unable (probably did not want to) to support Ukraine as promised:

– the West has not even been able to enforce the most elementary rules of international law: it has not been able to intervene with its organizations (such as the UN, and the international Courts of Justice), preventing crimes against humanity perpetrated in Russia (the West was not even able to guarantee the evacuation of the populations and the defense of civilian shelters, schools and hospitals).

– and the West allowed Russia to invade Ukraine although it had pledged to defend Ukraine with the Budapest Memorandum: first when Russia began the “civil war” in Dombass and illegally “annexed” the Crimea, then with the military invasion of 2022.


In other words, for Ukraine it is therefore a question of acquiring the awareness that

the success of its attempts to defend its Democracy
is not a question of human rights,
but a question of interests on the part of other Nations

And on this aspect Ukraine must work quickly, since its future depends on the result of this project: a satisfactory end to the war, and an effective reconstruction that will bring it back to a normal life condition.

As we see in the next chapters, Ukraine can take advantage of the opportunity of war (of a correctly developed post-war) to significantly improve its position in the international political scenario).

THE NEED FOR UKRAINE TO EARN A STRATEGICALLY STRATEGY POSITION (towards a revamped economic and political structure)

In order to change itself, and find a positive solution to this war, Ukraine must first understand that as regards the aid it asks for, it is not a moral question (to support the protection of human rights, to pity others, etc …). But it is a question of economics (or “business”).

This is the world, there is nothing wrong with that (although compassion and help not conditioned by the idea of ​​profit would be welcome). Either we adapt to it, or we are done for (in the case of Ukraine it would be destined to suffer the aggression of Russia indefinitely).


Ukraine must therefore consider how it can be successful in the context of international economics and politics:

[global economy] thanks to the strategic value that some of its resources have for other Western nations.

Ukraine must understand that
its offer can be revamped,
using the opportunity of post-war restructuring.

As we see below, it is therefore important that it redefine its offer (and structure itself).

It should be borne in mind that – if the war is ended properly – the restructuring must be repaid by Russia. That is, as happened to Germany after WW I), its resources will be largely used to pay back the damage caused by the war.


This restructuring is the real winning weapon of Ukraine.


this restructuring
must already be defined on paper,
to have an appeal towards new allies
already during the current phases of the war

(On the other hand, the strategy of continuing to pity aid to a West that will never really have the intention of privileging Ukraine over Putin is losing).

The next chapter analyzes the possibility for Ukraine to make a qualitative leap in the internal and external economy (and politics). And the possibility that with this step it can acquire a value that induces other nations to help it more effectively to win this war.


Ukraine can also be successful in the context of international economics and politics:

[international politics] thanks to the privileged position that it may have as a victim of an illegal aggression: if the war is closed correctly (according to the rules that have always been applied in these cases), Ukraine will have the role towards Russia that had France against Germany after WW I.

That is, Ukraine will have, according to the rules already applied in the past in similar cases, a position of strength towards other Western nations since it will have the role of controller of Russia in the compensation phase for the damage caused by it in this war (not it may be that of a “post-Putin Russia) <see GCW text “What will change for the West in relations with Russia (the conditions of Peace)”>).

In reality, this role will be partly shared by the other ex-Soviet countries (bordering Russia), if Ukraine immediately proceeds to develop a “first level” alliance with these nations – even if it has the right, as a country damaged by Russia , to conduct the compensation phase. [see next chapter “The need for a preliminary alliance with countries threatened by Russia”]



The two previous aspects of increasing the strategic value on the market of a revamped economy, and of leading the management of Russia in the post-war period, are closely linked to each other.

That is to say:

if Ukraine does not already manage to have a strong appeal for allies who help it to finish this war correctly (thanks to the offer of future favorable conditions in the export of resources from Ukraine) it will always remain under the domination of Russia,

That is, the war will continue indefinitely in various forms, making it impossible for Ukraine to recover a normal life.

But it is also true that if Ukraine won the war, and did not have a stronger position than the current one in the international economic/political context, it would still be denied the “traditional” role of winner of an unjust war (in terms of compensation management by Russia). And therefore it could not restructure itself by creating a better economy (in this case, that is, today’s “allied” nations would end up taking advantage of the post-war opportunity to develop their own interests, and to make Ukraine a state politically dependent on them). [see later chapter “Some clarifications on the two fundamental concepts“ peace ”and“ aid ”(the“ debt-trap diplomacy ”)].

How Ukraine must reset its relationship with the West (the need to define brand new alliances).

In summary, in order to get out of the current conflict so that it can recover its condition prior to the aggression of Russia (including the recovery of Crimea and Dombass), as regards its relations with the rest of the West,

Ukraine must (quickly)
make a radical change
in the approach of its foreign policies


The change in Ukraine that improves its strategic value (appeal) in the global political-economic scenario is based on the following points

The immediate definition of a future economic structure of Ukraine: even if for now this project remains on paper, it still constitutes a strategic value that allows Ukraine to ensure that other Western countries take a more significant interest in the its condition.

Without first defining this tempting offer,
no help can be obtained for Ukraine.


the creation of new alliances. – it is possible thanks to its revamped supply of exportable resources, which induces other nations to abandon the limited support strategies of the current alliances to enter into specific military support agreements directly with Ukraine.

It is crucial that Ukraine understands that without the creation of new alliances no real change can take place. As mentioned, the current alliances today can only lead to the ruin of Ukraine (beyond the declarations of intent, the members of the current alliances just cannot afford to let Putin lose the war).

The need for a preliminary alliance with countries threatened by Russia

A necessary step to have a further increase in Ukraine’s strategic value is most likely that of defining a preliminary alliance with the other countries directly affected by the threat from Russia (Baltic countries, Sweden and Finland, Moldova and Georgia, Poland which in June 2022 said it is ready to go to war alongside Ukraine).

The current problem is that it has not been assessed that it is not possible to create effective alliances with countries that do not have a vital common interest in them <see GCW text “An analysis of the problems of the current alliances“>


For Ukraine it is therefore necessary first of all to seek alliances with countries that share with it the vital interest of survival in the face of the Russian threat: the countries mentioned above are the only ones who truly realize the danger represented by a Russia with Putin in power – and who know that the UN, NATO, EU will never do anything to defend them, exactly as they are doing for Ukraine.

With the definition of a “preliminary alliance” for Ukraine it becomes easier to wage this war, as this modality to some extent reduces the responsibilities of Western states in supporting a war against Russia. Since in the new mode for the Great Powers it is a question of no longer directly helping the country at war with Russia, but of sending aid to a coalition of states, which will then “eventually” turn this aid to Ukraine (see further considerations in the next chapter “The need to create a” preliminary alliance””) ..

It should be borne in mind that these states have in any case been explicitly threatened with invasion by Putin, and therefore have every right to create their own coalition.

The fact is that in the Russia-Ukraine conflict it emerged that NATO has no intention of helping an unjustly attacked country like Ukraine because

1) are blocked by Putin’s nuclear threat.

2) their strength is actually based solely on a nuclear deterrent that Russia in the current conflict has shown to be a bluff (it did not prevent Russia from the bloody and illegal invasion of Ukraine). <see GCW text “The fall of the nuclear deterrent taboo: the possibility of defining a deterrent substantially different from the nuclear one“>

How Ukraine must work on itself to be able to define new effective alliances

The point is therefore that to be able to resume its status as a sovereign state (to recover the conditions prior to the current war)

Ukraine must absolutely
get out of the current situation of subjection
to other Western nations

(condition in which it is not taken seriously by anyone, but only gets a staging of superficial “aid” from most nations and international organizations)


To achieve this goal for Ukraine it is necessary:

● [international politics] to make other Western nations understand that Ukraine’s interest in defeating Russia is also in the interest of the entire West (the problem is that other Western nations seem to have misunderstood – Germany in the first place – that with a Putin defeat would have many advantages, such as that compared to the current conditions imposed by Russia in supplies such as gas).

The fact is that it would be necessary to make world public opinion understand what problems Western peoples would face if Putin remains in power in Russia.

And at the same time they should clarify what the advantages of dealing with a post-Putin Russia (ie defeat in this war) would be for all.

Ukraine should therefore take care
of developing a communication strategy
directed towards Western peoples,

in which the world is made aware of what is really happening in the Russia-Ukraine conflict.

The same communication must be made to the Russian people, who, learning the truth about the problems that the aggression in Ukraine caused them, would stop supporting Putin (for example in the next election in 2024).  <see text “The measures that we can (and must) take: sanctions and embargoes“>


● [global economy] to demonstrate that all Western nations have an interest in treating Ukraine as an equal due to the economic advantages that they may have in the future in commercial relations with a Ukraine revamped in its political/economic structure.



In summary: upstream of all the steps that Ukraine must follow in order to define alliances that will allow it to recover the condition prior to the war, are:

become aware of its strengths. That is, becoming aware that it is now in a weakened condition whereby no one will ever help her in a really effective way. And therefore

begin to develop strengths
that allow it to deal on an equal footing
with the Great Powers.

Strengths that derive from an intelligent capitalization of its resources (see next chapter).

distinguish between nation and nation in seeking an alliance.

That is,

by stopping to turn to nations that, or because they are bound by alliances such as the UN, NATO, EU, G7, World Economic Forum; or to specific interests with Russia, they will never be able to help it.

develop a new type of alliances that allow it both to win this war in a fair way, and to obtain the legitimate role of “controller” of Russia in the post-war (with countries that share with Ukraine the vital interest defended by an invasion by Russia, and which have understood that the current International Alliances will never intervene in their defense).


On the basis of what was previously considered, the sine qua non condition to be able to achieve a defeat of Russia and the recovery of full Sovereignty

Ukraine must start planning a new future for itself right now

A future in which Ukraine restructures itself by improving its strategic value towards other Western nations, which allows it to have such an appeal as to induce these nations to support it so that it can effectively emerge victorious from this war.

This is a radical transformation (but possible thanks to the conditions seen above of the possibility of exploiting the strategic value of a revamped supply of resources, and of controlling Russia’s post-war).

With this transformation, Ukraine can go from being a country subject to the West forced to go hat in hand to pity aid (which precisely because of its position of obvious weakness will never be given to it), to being a country how able to deal on an equal footing with the Great Powers.

That is, a definition of a new future must already be made, so that some nations are convinced that it is in their interest to effectively help the UKrane in order to be its privileged allies in the post-war period.

The characteristics of the new type of alliance

Therefore Ukraine must create new alliances if it is to achieve the two vital objectives:

Defeat Russia. This is crucial to be able to recover its sovereignty, and to be able to play the leading role in the control of Russia in the post-war period.

be able to implement a sustainable reconstruction that allows it to recover its pre-war economic level, <<see GCW article “The need to define a “sustainable reconstruction” for Ukraine (call for a correct restoration of peace in Ukraine)“>

The new alliances are indispensable to achieve these goals, since as we have seen during the current conflict, UN , NATO, EU are not – and never will – be able to do anything concrete for it, <see GCW text “The need to go beyond current alliances (UN and NATO)“>


The alliances Ukraine needs are of a radically new kind.

Summarizing what has been said previously, the characteristics of a new type of alliance that can be more effective than the current ones must:

have members who have vital interests in opposing the “policies” of autocratic countries (that is, there must be no members compromised with states such as Russia and China (such as Germany for example).

be able to move independently from current global organizations such as the UN and NATO.

As has emerged in the current Russia-Ukraine conflict, the constraints placed by these Alliances on their members prevent them from taking a personal position (which is really in favor of Ukraine).

The need to create a “preliminary alliance”

For the specific case of Ukraine, the strategy that can lead it to receive effective help must be based on

a two-tier alliance strategy,

This strategy consists of the following steps (tiers)

1) creation in the first place of local Alliances of Nations that run the same risks

A necessary step to further increase Ukraine’s strategic value is most likely that of defining a preliminary alliance with countries in its own condition of risks/interests. That is, with the other countries directly affected by the threat from Russia.

They are:

● the nations previously subject to the USSR (Baltic countries, Moldova and Georgia)

● the countries bordering Russia (Finland and Sweden).

And Poland, a very important country because it is the leader of the countries that oppose the reconstruction of the USSR; also Poland in June 2022 said it was ready to go to war alongside Ukraine.


As illustrated in other articles, it is not possible to create effective alliances with countries that do not have a vital common interest in them <see GCW text “The characteristics of a new type of alliance more effective than the current ones“>

For this reason, Ukraine must first seek alliances with countries that share the vital survival interest in the Russian threat (the fact is that the countries mentioned above are the only ones who truly realize the danger posed by Russia. with Putin in power – and who know that the UN, NATO, EU will do nothing to defend them, as they are doing for Ukraine).



being part of a cohesive coalition allows Ukraine to deal with other countries with a stronger position, since in this case it no longer presents itself

but as a member of a coalition of countries already accepted by the international community (the strong cohesion of the alliance derives from the fact that all members are fully aware of the fatal threat of a Russia not defeated in the current war).

It is basically the constitution of a mini-NATO alternative to NATO itself which, as we have seen in the case of the current conflict, was unable to do anything to neutralize the invasion by the Russian army.


One of the advantages of this “preliminary alliance” is that it becomes easier for Ukraine to wage this war, since

this modality to some extent reduces the responsibilities of Western states in supporting a war against Russia.

That is, in this new mode

for the Great Powers it is no longer a question of directly helping the country at war with Russia, but of sending aid to a coalition of states.

These military aid (weapons, means and men) given by the Great Powers in this case will “eventually” reach Ukraine in an indirect way.


Please note that the members of this new alternative mini-NATO

– unlike Ukraine, they have long established relationships with their current alliances (EU, NATO, etc …).

– they were however explicitly threatened with invasion by Putin, and therefore according to international “rules” they have every right to do everything to defend themselves (this right becomes a right of the whole coalition).

the new coalition defends the interests of the EU: in fact it assumes the important role of defending the borders of Europe (the EU by sending aid to the coalition only strengthens its defenses).


Regarding the ineffectiveness of NATO in the face of aggression by Russia and China, see in other articles how within these organizations the personal interests of members (such as those of Germany) prevail and  wreck any attempt to form a common front against the aggressor.

And how NATO’s strength is based almost exclusively on nuclear deterrent which, however, as we have seen, did nothing in the case of the attack on Ukraine.<see GCW text “The fall of the nuclear deterrent taboo: the possibility of defining a deterrent substantially different from the nuclear one“>


Speaking of an “alternative NATO”  based on Russia’s blockade of countries at “risk of invasion”, what was declared by Estonian PM Mart Helme in 2019 is significant: Estonia is ready to create a “Plan B”, that is an alternative to NATO that intervenes in the event that the latter fails to defend the ex-USSR countries from Russia. Although these statements have been partially retracted in order not to complicate relations with the current Alliances, the “Plan B” was then debated in a government meeting <read source>

The position of Poland is also significant: read for example  “How the Russia-Ukraine Crisis Is Turning Poland Into a Strategic Player.

2) creation of specific global alliances, alternatives to the current global organizations

With the new strategic position that this new type of local “preliminary” coalition provides, Ukraine is able to create new alliances with the rest of the West that will finally allow it to defeat Russia. And therefore to rebuild the country in a “sustainable” way.

It is a question of creating not only military alternatives to NATO such as the one just illustrated.

But also to obtain the strengthening of Ukraine’s position in the international political scenario (essential in order not to be defeated in this war)

it also depends on the creation of alternative economic alliances to the current one (such as EU, G7, etc…).

These are alternative alliances that eventually define specific agreements with the current international organizations.


The fact is that

It makes no sense for Ukraine
to aspire to join organizations such as the EU,
as this will not be of any benefit to it.

Neither for the solution of the conflict, nor for the post-war phase.

These organizations, in fact, are nothing more than a way to develop the interests of some specific members to the detriment of the economy of other members.

That is, with regard to the current conflict, we have seen how NATO and the EU, in fact, did not recognize the sovereignty of Ukraine by deciding not to intervene in the case of the invasion of the Russian army (nor have these organizations recognized civil rights Ukraine when its population was decimated – the same can be said for the UN).

This also happened earlier, when nothing was done to prevent the illegal annexation of Crimea, and the “civil war” developed by pro-Russian militias in Dombass.

It is necessary to acknowledge that the current world organizations are undermined by a factory defect that leads its members to develop their own interests at the expense of the interests of the organization. <see GCW text “Reflect on what are the factory defects of these organizations, and therefore find valid alternatives to them“>


Looking at when it took place in this conflict, it can be seen that the real aid came to Ukraine always from individual nations (almost exclusively the UK and the USA).

For this reason it is necessary for Ukraine to create new alliances by evaluating the opportunities offered by each individual nation. <see GCW text “The characteristics of a new type of alliance more effective than the current ones“>


 The question at stake here is that indicated by the Constitutions and Western Laws as fundamental to having a democratic regime:

1. freedom of choice (therefore freedom to ally with one wants).

2. legalization of relationships through specific contracts.

<see also GCW text “The need to create new alliances and new common policy“>


As mentioned in the previous chapters,

until it gains a new position in the global political/economic scenario, Ukraine will never be able to defeat Russia, and thus to resume a normal life.

For Ukraine, the war must be an opportunity for its economic reboot (and, in part, “political”) that strengthens its position (this can happen, among other things, with an improvement in its supply of exports of resources and artifacts ).


The problem with Ukraine is precisely that, if it is not able to improve its position in the global political landscape:

1) it will never be able to end the war in a positive way for itself (see previous chapter).

2) after the war it will become a country heavily dependent on the West.

The latter problem is emerging with the moves of Western nations with which them declare that they have projects for “aid” for Ukraine in its reconstruction phase

The basic problem is that in such proposals it is avoided to establish, upstream of everything, “what we are talking about”. That is, it is not specified:

1) what does “help” Urkaine mean (what would be the advantages and disadvantages of such “help”).

2) what is meant by “end of war” (and for “achievement of Peace”).

Without establishing the meaning of these concepts,
it is obviously not possible
to assess whether the proposals are actually demagogic traps

(which many clues seem to indicate).


There is indeed a fundamental contradiction in the various positions taken by Western nations which claim to want to support Ukraine in the war against Russia.

That is, on the one hand, the governments of these nations claim to be totally on the side of Ukraine, and want to see Ukraine in a state of peace as soon as possible, but

at the same time them
deny Ukraine the possibility of defeating Russia.


In other words, in reality the Western nations are pressing for the war to “end” in a way that favors their interests, but which in fact sacrifices the interests of Ukraine (specifically, it is denied the possibility of resuming a normal life, with satisfactory economic conditions).

The solutions proposed today by the Great Powers are essentially aimed at continuing to have gas supplies from Russia.


That is, today one pretends not to know that the idea pursued by the West, of “ending” the war so that Putin’s Russia can maintain the position acquired militarily during the war, in the future:

puts Russia in a position to be able to continue threatening the safety of the former USSR states.

puts the entire West in the condition of being intrinsically blackmailed by Russia, which will interfere more and more with the political decisions of European countries.


Today we pretend not to understand that in order to end the war in a positive way for the West (so that international laws are respected in this regard), it is necessary for Ukraine to recover its status as a sovereign state. That is, that (1) Ukraine will recover the conditions prior to the illegal “annexation” of Crimea in 2014, and that (2) Putin is somehow ousted from power in Russia (only with a post-Putin Russia can negotiations be started credible).  <see GCW article “With Putin in power, nothing positive can be done (the Putin’s fall)“>

Some clarifications on the two fundamental concepts “peace” and “aid” (the “debt-trap diplomacy”)

Therefore, as regards the “offers” that the Western world today (possibly excluding the UK) proposes to Ukraine for the solution of the problem of the ongoing war, upstream of everything it is necessary to clarify the meaning of the key concepts on which such offers are based:

1) what is meant by the condition of peace that is thought to be achieved in Ukraine (what is meant by “ending the war”).

2) what is meant by aid for the post-war of Ukraine.


The problem is that without these two points being clarified, Ukraine risks falling from the double trap:

subjection to “allied” countries.

economic: the demagogic trap of the classic “debt-trap diplomacy” in which some Great Powers offer help to countries in difficulty in order to then be able to exploit their resources to their advantage (see the case of the puppet-State, and of Greece towards of Germany).

politics (political subjection): the type of “aid” proposed today binds the receiving state to develop internal policies approved by those who have provided the aid (see the case of the EU – Germany – and Italy).

Subjection towards Russia: by accepting the Peace towards which the EU pushes it, Ukraine accepts a lifetime military subjection towards Russia (Ukraine should coexist with the army of a nation that has already proved to be devoid of any scruple).


As mentioned elsewhere, the paradoxical aspect of this is that in this way the West not only damages Ukraine, but also damages itself. In fact, by “closing” the war without a real defeat of Russia (and a fall of Putin) it condemns itself to be subjected to Putin for a long time.

Probably different is the case of UK, which has proved to be a country “not aligned” with the international Establishment (it is out of the EU games) and which seems to offer Ukraine less conditioning aid (the problem is that since PM Boris Johnson has begun to offer such aid, the Internal Establishment tries to bring it down).


For these reasons it is precisely necessary to have clear in mind what are the criteria on which the peace (and reconstruction) projects in Ukraine are based.

1) What is meant by the condition of Peace (to “end the war”)?

A fundamental point to evaluate how much the proposals to quickly end the war with Russia are actually practicable by Ukraine, is the clarification of what is the meaning of the concept of “end of war” implicit in the proposals of the West (ie what is means by “condition of peace” that them want to achieve).


Ending the war means, according to the rules always applied by the West, that

1) the illegally attacked country must be able to restore the conditions of peace it enjoyed before the war began.

2) the attacking country:

must reimburse all the damage caused by his aggression

must be put in a position not to repeat the aggression again.

This happened in the West for any previous war, such as in the two World Wars.

In the absence of such conditions, one cannot speak

● nor a real end to the war (the attacking country remains a threat not only for the country already attacked, but for other countries bordering it)

● nor of a condition of real peace, since the attacked country would suffer a military subjection by an aggressor who has never renounced his original purposes.


The question is that

in order to obtain a real condition of Peace, the following conditions must be met:

full justice is done according to international rules

the freedom of the attacked people is obtained

freedom of Government of the attacked State is obtained to Govern according to the interests of its Citizens.



if these consolidated rules in the “civilized world” are not respected. you cannot have real peace.

The problem is that real peace is not achieved neither for the attacked country, nor for the other Western nations which today are proposing the solution we are talking about to Ukraine.

That is, the Western nations do not realize that without a defeat of Russia (and without the fall of Putin)

● they yield to the law of the strongest, and for them a clear threat to their economic and political future is outlined (while if Putin were to fall, they would free themselves from the current conditions of economic subjection for gas supplies).

<see GCW article “The sharp downsizing of post-Putin Russia (Russia will no longer be a problem for the west, but an advantage)“> .

● they obtain a weak Ukraine, and this damages the future global political equilibrium (Ukraine, among other things, with the current proposals for “Peace” practically becomes a puppet-state of the West due to the “slave contracts” that I impose on her with the excuse of helping her in post-war reconstruction).

<see GCW text “The sine qua non condition for having truly functioning alliances (political and economic benefits)“>



From these considerations, it emerges that “ending the war” means for Ukraine to recover sovereignty over its territory (recovery of Dombass and Crimea which will obviously then be subjected to legal referendums).

<vedi ulteriori considerazioni nel GCW article “Lack of awareness of what a true condition of Peace is (the illusion of immediate relief)“>


The need for a Ukraine that regains its full sovereignty

Freedom of a country, from a political point of view, means sovereignty.

In other words, if a stable peace is to be achieved for the whole West (Ukraine is on the border with autocratic empires),

Ukraine must be a truly sovereign, that is, truly independent state.

Otherwise it will always try to find compromise situations by aligning with other states that pursue their interests that are not compatible with those of Europe (as in the past it did with Russia – see the puppet-state that fell in 2014 – and with the USA of Obama-Biden).


The fact is that

(which is indicated by the Western Constitutions
as the fundamental element of the nation),

 That is, a real sovereignty of the nations participating in an alliance guarantees the fact that the states act on the basis of the will of the parliaments (of the citizens).

Otherwise, the decisions will be taken by Rulers who will take into consideration interests dictated by the Nation by which them are blackmailed, or by those of the financial lobbies (this was the case of Germany, when its PM signed the North Stream agreement with Russia, to get a rich salary from Russia in exchange).

<see GCW text “Have a position of strength (non-dependence/real sovereignty)”>

2) What is meant by “aid” for the reconstruction of Ukraine?

Another fundamental point to evaluate how much the West’s proposals for a reconstruction of Ukraine are “sustainable” both for the latter and for the entire West, is the clarification of what is meant by “help” to be offered to Ukraine.

In this regard it is necessary to understand some fundamental issues:

– the economic “help”, according to the international rules always applied in these cases, must come from Russia as compensation for the damage produced (as was done, for example, after WW I when Germany had to compensate France ). See how this help is not a “favor” for Ukraine, but a duty. <see GCW text “Some key points of the reconstruction of Ukraine: aid is a duty“>

Russia is able to meet this legitimate demand thanks to the abundance of its natural resources such as gas and oil

– for Western states it is not a question of participating in the reconstruction of Ukraine directly, or with companies of their own nation. Rather,

it is a question of enabling Ukraine
to rebuild its own country, its own economy.

We remember that this is a fundamental point, since an independent, strong Ukraine is a fundamental quality to have a correct global political balance in the future.

Some considerations on the relationship between Ukraine and other Western nations

The question of the “aid” necessary for the reconstruction of Ukraine requires a reflection, upstream of everything, on the context in which action is taken.

That is, in this case it must be considered that:

1) Ukraine must be treated as a sovereign state illegally attacked (as it was for France at the end of WW I). And, as mentioned above, this must be taken into account in the definition of refunding.


2) Ukraine fought for the West, defending the integrity of the democracies (at least of the European ones).

That is – assuming Ukraine is allowed to defeat Putin’s Russia – the sacrifice of Ukrainian people and cities has allowed the West to stop the invasion of a part of Europe (which began with Chechnya and Georgia, and then scheduled for ex-USSR countries bordering to the east)

From this point of view

the West must consider that
intervening for the reconstruction of Ukraine

If anything, the West must consider that by properly helping Ukraine to rebuild itself “it is doing itself a favor”, since in this way it has the guarantee of obtaining a new stable world political equilibrium.


3) it is not possible to carry out a “reconstruction” like the one done in Iraq and Afghanistan, since in this case it is not the usual strategy of the West of “exporting democracy”. But it is a question of restoring an already existing democracy, as it was for the European nations liberated from Nazism in WW II.