Ukraine War - NEWS

LA SITUAZIONE IN EVOLUZIONE

Putin sta preparando il passaggio da una guerra tradizionale (che ha praticamente perduto) ad una “guerra sporca” (crimini contro l’umanità) portando in Ukraine milizie che combattano un urban warfare che è impossibile condurre con un esercito normale <see articoli>.

Putin .. fase politica che avrebbe voluto attuare in pochi giorni in Kiev, con il governo centrale: sta mettendo Mayor nelle città occupate, e sta preparando un fake-referendum per poter affermare – proprio come ha fatto in Crimea – che tali territori vogliono essere annessi alla Russia <see articoli “2014 Crimean status referendum – Wikipedia”>

● Russia ..Lo stringere .. l’Informazione .. pene nuove pene pesanti per chi è contro la guerra … .. la sua arma interna .. significa che Putin è in difficoltà nella Politica interna (se perde .. putin è finito) (il problema è se putin sentendosi finito vuole portare anche gli altri nella tomba).

BREAKING NEWS [UPDATES]

  • Wake Up call for Ukraine:   either it changes his approach or it ends up becoming a puppet state of Putin and the West

     

    Ukraine must realize that

    today it “is nobody”,
    and that if he wants to resume a normal life
    it has to take a leap and become “adult”.

    that is, Ukraine must understand that:

    the great powers have no intention of allowing Putin to be defeated (and to withdraw from Ukraine), and therefore

    they will never provide weapons to fight Russia effectively.

    they make direct agreements – in secret – with Putin.

    the great powers are dividing Ukraine for the post-war period: they plan to create a puppet state dependent partly on Putin, and partly on the West.

    <see GCW text “Some clarifications on the two fundamental concepts “peace” and “aid” (the “debt-trap diplomacy”)“>

    <see GCW article “warning: the false concept of peace of the West (the death trap for Ukraine)“>

    Ukraine must stop trying to be accepted into the current alliances (NATO, EU, etc …) which today are in themselves a failure

    <see GCW text “The need to go beyond current alliances (UN and NATO)“>

    Towards possible solutions

    Ukraine in order to resume a normal life (without which it ceases to be a sovereign State)

    ► First of all, it must remember that
    without Putin’s fall there is no future for Ukraine.

    <see GCW article “With Putin in power, nothing positive can be done (the Putin’s fall)“>

    Ukraine must understand that today it actually has no say in the international political landscape

    And that until it is able to change that position, it will get nothing from the West.

    <see GCW text “The key-points to be able to conceive a “sustainable reconstruction” of Ukraine: The question of (real) Sovereignty“>

    That is, Ukraine must understand that

    it is self-destroying by continuing to pity aid that will never arrive (no one is more interested in the massacres of civilians it suffers continuously).

    – and it must stop trying to enter the current international alliances, in which due to its position of weakness it will never be allowed to enter.

    <see GCW article “warning: the false concept of peace of the West (the death trap for Ukraine)“>

    .

    <see GCW text “The question of legitimate defense“>

    <see GCW article  “The basic problem: lack of awareness of what a true condition of Peace is“>

    Ukraine must take a leap and become an adult, creating new forms of alliances

    create a “preliminary alliance” with countries that know that with Putin in power they are finished.

    <see GCW article “The need to define a “sustainable reconstruction” for Ukraine (call for a correct restoration of peace in Ukraine)“>

    Only then Ukraine,

    with a sort of “alternative NATO”,
    it will be able
    to organize a real counter-offensive against Russia.

    <see GCW text “The need for a preliminary alliance with countries threatened by Russia“>  

    within this new anti-Putin alliance, Ukraine will be able to obtain substantial aid from the Great Powers (for now it is forced to “play war” with toy weapons that are useless).

    organize international courts that put Russian military and politicians out of action (and allies such as Belarus).  <see GCW text “The measures that we can (and must) take: Actions by international bodies such as the international criminal court“>

    to make agreements with the various States with which Ukraine undertakes to be a privileged supplier of its resources in the future.

    <see GCW article “Towards new alliances able to maintain a real condition of Peace“>

    Ukraine must also make the West understand how a correct end of the war (with the fall of Putin) is an advantage for all

    <see GCW article “The sharp downsizing of post-Putin Russia (Russia will no longer be a problem for the west, but an advantage)“>

    <see GCW text “Solutions for the West: how to definitively neutralize Russia” >

    <see GCW article “Ukraine must become an “adult country” in order to be able to deal with other nations as equals“>

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  • warning: how Ukraine can win or lose the war

    Ukraine can only win the war if it operates
    (immediately, and more effectively than today)
    on two levels:

    military level: with “indirect” aid (supplies of weapons and “consultancy”) sufficient to defeat Russia on the ground (which is not happening at all).

    <see GCW article “The shift in the concept of war and arms“>

    <see GCW article “The need to innovate the concept of armaments as a deterrent“>

    .

    political/economic level: with strategies such as sanctions and embargoes (which have never been implemented sufficiently to put Russia in difficulty).

    <see GCW article “The measures that we can (and must) take“>

    ● military level (the two phases of the war):

    To understand why Ukraine is losing the war at the beginning of summer 2022 it is necessary to understand that there were two phases of the war:

    1) phase 1 (attempt to occupy Kyiv by Russia): Ukraine, by forcing the Russians to withdraw from the North (Kiev) has shown that when it fights with adequate weapons it can win: in this phase light weapons and guerrilla tactics were needed .

    2) phase 2 (attack by Russia in the Donbass); in this phase the fighting methods are radically different: the Russians bomb the territory from afar, and when it is “cleared” they advance. In this case, in order not to be defeated, it is necessary to have long-range weapons that allow you to:

    destroy the enemy positions from which the rockets depart.

    hit, behind enemy lines, the structures through which the Russians supply the first line of vehicles, armaments, ammunition, fuel, etc …

    In the absence of this possibility, the Russian army ends up prevailing over the Ukrainian one (one of the problems of Ukraine is that it is now short of soldiers, while Russia can recruit “indefinitely” on its vast territory)

    Obviously once “the damage is done”, ie the Russians have conquered the Donbass, it is necessary to start over from phase 1 (“guerrilla”) to push the Russians out of the Donbass.

    .

    The fact is that (probably excluding the UK)

    the West has no intention of defeating Putin’s Russia:

    that is, it does not understand how it is not possible to negotiate any form of Peace with Putin. <see GCW article “With Putin in power, nothing positive can be done (the Putin’s fall)“>

    That is, the Great Powers expect Ukraine to negotiate a Peace in which Putin keeps the conquered territories (a situation in which Putin would actually continue to threaten to invade the rest of the Ukrainian territory). <*** see article in .. synopsis in development “the false concept of peace .. ***>

    .

    For these reasons, if wants to win the war so that it can resume a normal life, Ukraine must stop pitying aid to world organizations (NATO, EU, etc.), which will never arrive.

    Ukraine must instead create an alliance
    with other countries
    that were somehow part of the USSR,

    ie who are well aware of the fact that if Russia wins in Ukraine, they are destined to do the same. <see GCW text “The need for a preliminary alliance with countries threatened by Russia“>  

    .

    In the current situation, the critical points are:

    Ukraine is denied its right of defense

    Today Ukraine is denied a fundamental right such as that of responding to unprovoked violence with more violence sufficient to neutralize the aggressor: that is

    the attacked person has
    the right to use any tool to be able to defeat
    those who try to kill him.

    <see, on the question of the use of force for defense, my texts “The question of legitimate defense” and “An analysis of human factors related to violence events”>

    the West does not understand that paradoxically with a defeated Putin there would be great advantages for everyone

    – if it does not defeat Russia in this war (to the point of bringing about a fall of Putin), the West will not only always remain under Russia’s blackmail, but it will also give the green light to China (which is much more powerful and dangerous than Russia) in its policy of military expansion (primarily with the “annexation” of Taiwan).

    – if instead it were more committed to defeating Putin’s Russia, the West would get a much better situation than the current one, since at which point Russia would be greatly downsized, and for some years subjected to a regime of control by the Great Powers (as happened, for example, for Germany after WW I). In this situation, the West would no longer be subjected to Putin’s blackmail, for example for gas supplies. <see GCW article “The sharp downsizing of post-Putin Russia (Russia will no longer be a problem for the west, but an advantage)“>

    .

    Among other things, from the military point of view, it is necessary to take into account that this conflict has shown that the nuclear threat from the autocratic powers such as Russia can be circumvented by providing “indirect aid” to the attacked state.<see GCW article “The shift in the concept of war and arms“>

    Furthermore, it is necessary to consider that the nuclear deterrent on the part of the West, on which NATO is essentially based, has fallen, which therefore becomes obsolete. <see GCW text “The fall of the nuclear deterrent taboo: the possibility of defining a deterrent substantially different from the nuclear one“>

    ● political/economic level

    The defeat of Putin’s Russia is not a question that can be achieved simply by fighting the Russian army, but

    in addition to the military level,
    it is necessary to act
    on the economic, political and judicial levels.

    .

    For example, these are sanctions that no one seriously wanted to apply, neither when it came to preventing the invasion of Ukraine, nor when the massacres that Russia committed on Ukrainian territory should have been prevented.

    Or the trials of those responsible for crimes against humanity, which would serve to inhibit these perpetrators (and allied countries) from continuing to serve Putin.

    <see GCW text “Solutions for the West: how to definitively neutralize Russia” >

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  • warning: THE FALSE CONCEPT OF PEACE OF THE WEST (THE DEATH TRAP FOR UKRAINE)

    Today the West speaks of Peace, in reality

    it refers to something that is not peace at all:
    it is instead something that
    some Great Powers need to develop their own interests
    at the expense of other countries

    (Ukraine, Baltic countries, etc ..).

    That is, the West today, in order to better develop its interests. uses a trick based on a play on words – demagogy – with which it wants to make something that is not at all appear positive.

    A lethal trap for Ukraine – as we will see – into which it must not fall.

    The lethal trap of the position of support for Ukraine by the great powers: the proposal of a false condition of peace

    The issue is in fact that after the Davos 2022 global finance conference there has been an alignment of the Great Powers on a line in which the main points are:

    – they propose to support Ukraine in order to bring it to a condition of Peace soon. But in that

    it is assumed that Ukraine should cede Donbass and Crimea to Russia.

    (The latter concept is obviously very rarely expressed, and with euphemisms such as “to have Peace it is necessary to concede something to Russia”, since this concept – however refined the demagogy may be – is difficult for most to accept).

    .

    The problem is that these two concepts are in stark contradiction between them. That is to say

    in this way there can be no peace condition
    (and there is not even a Ukraine).

    .

    More specifically,

    If Ukraine does not regain possession of Donbass and Crimea, it will not revert to being a sovereign state.

    Of course, the final decisions on Donbass and Crimea must be left to referendum – this time legal. But Russia has to withdraw from them.

    The fact is that in the absence of such conditions there would be no real Ukraine. so long as

    the threat of invasion by Russia that existed before this war would be even greater with the Russian Army “legitimized” by not being punished for invading Ukraine. <see text “The measures that we can (and must) take: Actions by international bodies such as the international criminal court“>

     Furthermore, Ukraine, in this condition,

    it would have to renounce decisive parts for its economy (natural resources and industries present on these territories), and therefore it would not be able to regain its place in international commercial relations (and in the EU it would be considered with a secondary member, admitted to be accepted).

    <see GCW text “The key-points to be able to conceive a “sustainable reconstruction” of Ukraine: The question of (real) Sovereignty“>

    .

    if Russia is not officially defeated (with the consequent fall of Putin), the whole Western world will remain subject to Putin who, among other things, will continue

    – to blackmail the West in supplying natural gas.

    – to develop its plan for the “annexation” of neighboring nations. With serious consequences for Urkaine (and other nations such as the Baltic countries and Moldova).

    Note that by avoiding Putin’s defeat (and fall), China would feel entitled to develop its already planned military invasion plan in neighboring states such as Taiwan.

    .

    See the GCW texts in this regard:

    -<see GCW text “Some clarifications on the two fundamental concepts “peace” and “aid” (the “debt-trap diplomacy”)“>

    – Putin’s fall is necessary to reach a real condition of Peace. <see GCW article “With Putin in power, nothing positive can be done (the Putin’s fall)“>

    – the West, paradoxically, does not realize that with a defeated Russia, and therefore resized, there would be advantages for all <see GCW article “The sharp downsizing of post-Putin Russia (Russia will no longer be a problem for the west, but an advantage)“>

    See also GCW article: “.. the mistake of aiming .. EU ..” ***

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  • What’s at stake: it is a world war of authoritarian states against western democracies

    What are the factors to consider in order to correctly assess the situation in the Russia-Ukraine conflict?

    It is not the question of a war between Russia and Ukraine, but of how Putin’s “expansionism” (military and political) can evolve: if he continued to implement his plans, he would come to politically “subdue” the rest of Europe.

    Furthermore, the international situation must be taken into account: Russia is part of the “Axis” with China and Iran, which had joint military exercises before this war.

    Western nations do not seem to understand how the future global political condition is being played out in Ukraine (largely compromised for some time, for which much can still be done and is not done).

    The underlying problem seems to be that today the memories of the past have been lost: of the dictatorships of the 20th century that for a long time were able to dominate the world bringing misfortunes for all nations (50 million people died to get rid of Nazism <source>, and the Soviet Union caused at least 30 million civilian deaths in Eastern Europe <source>).

    Today, that is, the ability to evaluate the cost/benefit factor of a situation seems to have been lost: immediate advantages are chosen (in the illusion of having a condition of peace offered by the idea of ​​not being involved in a war). And we are unable to see the threats of the consequences of such a choice in the long run (exactly as was done with Hitler in the early stages of Germany’s expansion.

     The critical point is that it can lead to a nuclear war. Based on what Putin <source> said, and on his profile, he could make extreme choices.

    The problem is that it is now much more difficult to intervene to avert Putin’s invasion, and therefore its possible further expansion towards the Baltic countries..

    It is therefore necessary to carefully evaluate “what can still be done” (but the problem is that most Nations do not realize that too little has been done, and that the question is the time factor is decisive).

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  • The current sanctions are actually counterproductive

     

    [an abstract of the GCW article “The characteristics of alliances in step with the times“]

    Sanctions are “weapons”, which therefore must be effective, hit the mark. Otherwise sanctions are not only a waste of time, but them can become counterproductive because the “smart ones” (for example those who have no scruples, probably because it is not a real Democracy, and the decisions of the Governors are absolutely independent from the will of the Citizens) can take advantage of the illusory safety of the sanctioners to expand their global power.

    Paraphrasing Carl von Clausewitz, sanctions are the weapons that are used to avoid a situation of war: if they do not “really hurt” the opponent, they are useless and counterproductive.

     .

    Russia’s attack on Ukraine showed that the sanctions applied against Russia for years have not worked.

    This must lead to some reflections on how we can go beyond the current conception of sanctions (among other things, review the current Alliances, which have turned out to be out of step with the times).

    The sanctions, to be effective:

    ● them must be applied on multiple levels:

    economic level: them must be able both to punish the ruling class (Politics and Market) so that it is forced to abandon the leadership of the country; and to significantly lower the quality of life of the population (in this case it is the equivalent of the bombing of the city of WW II).

    It is crucial that the sanctioned people know that there is an attractive alternative to the current regime (it is one of the causes of the fall of the Berlin Wall).

    Judicial plan: necessary since the threat of severe sentences is a convincing weapon for those who are violating the rules (there are significant examples such as those of Milosevic and Saddam Hussein)

    ● them must be applied with a sufficient number of allies: (multi-lateral): it is necessary to have an effective position of force (in alliances there must not be any States dependent on the sanctioned Country in any way).

    It is crucial – so that we can have the necessary position of strength – that each Ally is involved on the basis of a vital interest for the Nation, otherwise, as it was for Germany for the first part of the Russia-Ukraine conflict, this Nation will not be sufficiently motivated to face the burdens and risks of applying sanctions.

    <see the in-depth article in the article “The characteristics of alliance in step with the times“>

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  • Ukraine president hints he may accept Putin’s NATO demand after saying negotiations going ‘pretty good’

    Some interesting comments from Volodomyr Zelenskyy are emerging, around Ukraine and its potential NATO membership.
    Having said before Russia’s invasion that he wanted his country to become part of the alliance, he was quoted last week as saying he had “cooled” on the idea.

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  • Day 20 of Russia’s invasion – this is what you need to know if you’re just joining us

    Lorem Ipsum è un testo segnaposto utilizzato nel settore della tipografia e della stampa. Lorem Ipsum è considerato il testo segnaposto standard sin dal sedicesimo secolo, quando un anonimo tipografo prese una cassetta di caratteri e li assemblò per preparare un testo campione. È sopravvissuto non solo a più di cinque secoli, ma anche al passaggio alla videoimpaginazione, pervenendoci sostanzialmente inalterato. <vedi post>

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BREAKING NEWS [UPDATES]

  • How the Russia-Ukraine Crisis Is Turning Poland Into a Strategic Player

    Source: How the Russia-Ukraine Crisis Is Turning Poland Into a Strategic Player

    As a key NATO ally that shares a 332-mile border with Ukraine, Poland has been quietly bracing for the worst. Towns across the country have been setting up accommodations to prepare for the up to 1 million refugees who could arrive if Russian forces, which have now entered Russia’s proxy states in eastern Ukraine, touch off a wider war. After hackers hit several Ukrainian ministries and two major banks in the country last week, Poland’s public administration and security services heightened their own vigilance against potential cyberattacks. Now that a full-scale Russian invasion of Ukraine appears more likely by the day, Polish leaders are keenly aware that what happens in the coming weeks will inevitably affect Poland, too.

    So far, Warsaw’s diplomatic and military profile in the region has only grown throughout the crisis.

    Poland has been the main destination for U.S. troops arriving in Eastern Europe since January: After sending 2,000 soldiers to Poland and Germany in early February, Washington deployed 3,000 additional troops to Poland, including from the 101st Airborne Division. U.S. Defense Secretary Lloyd Austin also announced a $6 billion weapons sale to Warsaw, which will include 250 M1 Abrams tanks, as he visited U.S. troops in Poland last week. On Monday, Washington moved its diplomatic staff in Ukraine to Poland.

    As a key NATO ally that shares a 332-mile border with Ukraine, Poland has been quietly bracing for the worst. Towns across the country have been setting up accommodations to prepare for the up to 1 million refugees who could arrive if Russian forces, which have now entered Russia’s proxy states in eastern Ukraine, touch off a wider war. After hackers hit several Ukrainian ministries and two major banks in the country last week, Poland’s public administration and security services heightened their own vigilance against potential cyberattacks. Now that a full-scale Russian invasion of Ukraine appears more likely by the day, Polish leaders are keenly aware that what happens in the coming weeks will inevitably affect Poland, too.

    So far, Warsaw’s diplomatic and military profile in the region has only grown throughout the crisis.

    Poland has been the main destination for U.S. troops arriving in Eastern Europe since January: After sending 2,000 soldiers to Poland and Germany in early February, Washington deployed 3,000 additional troops to Poland, including from the 101st Airborne Division. U.S. Defense Secretary Lloyd Austin also announced a $6 billion weapons sale to Warsaw, which will include 250 M1 Abrams tanks, as he visited U.S. troops in Poland last week. On Monday, Washington moved its diplomatic staff in Ukraine to Poland.

    Meanwhile, Poland has been providing Kyiv with vital support. Since December, Polish politicians have been visiting Kyiv to show solidarity with Ukraine; announced plans to send tens of thousands of artillery shells, anti-aircraft weapons, and mortars, among other arms, to the country; and, as of last week, finalized a new tripartite security agreement between Poland, Ukraine, and the United Kingdom that aims to improve trade and defense cooperation between the three countries.

    Yet Poland’s importance in the slow-burning crisis may rise still further. Sitting between Russia’s post-Soviet sphere and Western Europe, Poland is no stranger to great-power confrontation. As both a target and vocal opponent of Russian ambitions, NATO’s largest member in Eastern Europe is positioned to play a crucial role in Europe’s security relationship with Russia and become the linchpin of Western efforts to project power in Eastern Europe.


    There’s a reason the West has focused on Poland during this crisis: Poland is currently the top defense spender in Eastern Europe behind Russia itself, and its critical location in the region makes it a key part of NATO’s deterrence network against Moscow.

    Poland sits on the edges of the farthest western extensions of Russia’s presence in Europe: Russia’s Kaliningrad exclave and Belarus, which has effectively become a Russian proxy state since Belarusian leader Aleksandr Lukashenko called in Russian support against nationwide protests disputing his sham reelection in 2020.

    Since then, Russian President Vladimir Putin has used Belarus to threaten Poland. After Warsaw supported and provided refuge to the Belarusian opposition, Lukashenko engineered a migrant crisis in 2021, almost certainly with backing from Moscow, that left thousands of migrants stranded along the Polish—and European Union—border. According to Poland and the EU, Lukashenko’s weaponization of migrants and his concurrent wave of propaganda against Poland constituted hybrid warfare. In addition, Belarusian forces destroyed Polish border barriers, harassed Polish security forces, and allegedly fired blanks at Polish forces—the closest confrontation between a NATO member state and a Russian ally since the end of the Cold War.

    Even before the current crisis, Poland, which joined NATO in 1999, had long been at odds with Russia. After occupying Poland for 123 years prior to World War I, Russia invaded Poland again during World War II and installed a puppet communist regime after the war that lasted until 1989. Since then, the two countries have sparred due to Warsaw’s opposition to Putin’s regional posturing and its support for Ukraine’s moves to embrace the West since 2014. “Poland impedes Russia because we have a long history of proximity and we don’t shy away from explaining Russia to the West,” said Radoslaw Sikorski, who served as Poland’s foreign minister and defense minister in past governments and is now a member of the European Parliament.

    Now, Poles are increasingly wary of looming threats on their doorstep amid the Russia-Ukraine crisis. Beyond the potential for waves of disinformation, cyberattacks, and more of the kind of hybrid warfare that Poland faced from Belarus last year, Russian forces stationed as close as 124 miles from Warsaw in Belarus have also rattled Poland. These forces are primarily meant to menace Ukraine, but Polish Foreign Minister Zbigniew Rau has called their presence a “great concern.”

    Although any Russian attack on Ukraine would have an enormous impact on Poland and the region, “the direct threat against Poland will come from the territory of Belarus, not from the territory of Ukraine,” said Marek Swierczynski, the head of the security desk at the Polish research institution Polityka Insight.

    Given the threats posed by a militant, Kremlin-reliant Belarus, and Poland’s aversion to a major conflict breaking out across Ukraine, it appears inevitable that Poland will be forced to become even more of a strategic player in the region. And that’s a role Warsaw clearly wants to take on.

    “Poland, from the very beginning of this tension that Russia is evoking, has been trying to play on the international stage very actively,” said Michal Potocki, a journalist with the Polish magazine Dziennik Gazeta Prawna and a lecturer at the University of Warsaw. “The strengthening of democracy in Ukraine, and the strengthening of political pluralism in Ukraine, serves to also strengthen the pro-Western orientation of [Ukraine].”

    Creating a prosperous Ukraine free of Russian interventionism is about more than just security for Warsaw. It is also vital to safeguarding economic and social ties between the two countries. Poland is Ukraine’s second-largest trading partner behind China, and as the largest immigrant group in Poland today, Ukrainian residents and laborers have become an integral part of the Polish economy.

    And it’s not just Polish policymakers who care about protecting their southeastern neighbor. According to a pan-European poll conducted last month by the European Council on Foreign Relations, 65 percent of Poles said their country should come to Ukraine’s defense if it were attacked by Russia—a much higher percentage than in any other country polled. Poland’s ruling Law and Justice party’s styling of itself as the single-handed defender of Europe from Russian and Belarusian incursions may have contributed to such attitudes.


    “Paradoxically, this conflict could be an opportunity for Poland,” said Tomasz Grzywaczewski, a Polish journalist and expert at the Warsaw Institute.

    In addition to bringing Poland closer to its regional allies, Rau visited Moscow last week in his capacity as this year’s chair of the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe in hopes of reducing regional tensions. And Poland’s new alliance with Ukraine and the U.K. suggests Warsaw wants to expand its role as a regional node of security cooperation between Western Europe and Ukraine.

    Nevertheless, this role has so far grown only outside the institutions of the EU. Even as the current crisis has progressed, Poland’s long-running battles with the EU have persisted, and a European court struck down a Polish legal challenge related to rule-of-law issues last week. According to Sikorski, disagreements of this kind have weakened Poland’s efforts to build alliances within Europe.

    Still, amid the crisis, Poland has taken a step back on divisive, internal quarrels in the EU. For instance, Polish President Andrzej Duda has introduced legislation getting rid of controversial judicial reforms, stating that “we don’t need this fight.” “The absolute priority is the security of the continent, the security of the Western world understood broadly, the security of Ukraine, the security of Poland,” Potocki said.

    Even if Putin does decide to stop short of open war with Ukraine, the political moment that Poland has found itself in is not one that will pass soon. Expanding Warsaw’s military budget, which the government has pledged to do as it plans to more than double the size of its troops, will allow Poland to become more self-sufficient in its own security in years ahead—as will continued efforts to smooth over the rows that have tarnished its relationship with the EU.

    Poland knows it must prepare for a future in which it will have to play a leading role in keeping Putin’s Russia at arm’s length. After all, this crisis will almost certainly not be the region’s last.

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  • No Peace at Any Price in Ukraine | Foreign Affairs

    Source: No Peace at Any Price in Ukraine | Foreign Affairs

    As Russia’s war in Ukraine enters its fourth month, calls are growing in Western Europe and the United States for a diplomatic push to end the war. In late May, Italy proposed a four-point peace plan for Ukraine that would culminate in sanctions relief for Russia. Not long after, former U.S. Secretary of State Henry Kissinger, speaking at Davos, called on Ukraine to cede territory to Russia and to begin negotiations immediately. And at the beginning of June, French President Emmanuel Macron repeated his call to not “humiliate” Russia. In the halls of power, a consensus seems to be emerging: give Moscow land in exchange for peace.

    In Ukraine, however, the opposite view has taken hold. Speaking directly to Kissinger’s comments, President Volodymyr Zelensky retorted that “those who advise Ukraine to give away something to Russia . . . are always unwilling to see ordinary people.” He is joined in this view by most Ukrainians—82 percent of whom, according to a May poll, oppose any territorial concessions. Not surprisingly, a population attacked so brutally and unjustly is decidedly uninterested in rewarding the bully with pieces of its homeland.

    Zelensky and the Ukrainian people are right: pressuring Ukraine into a negotiated settlement with territorial concessions would not lead to long-term peace and stability in Europe. Rather, it would reward Russian military aggression in the short term, create a new swath of instability in the heart of Europe, and effectively condone Russian war crimes. A peaceful settlement sounds reasonable in theory. But in practice—in this war, at this moment—it would yield no lasting peace.

    THE PROBLEM WITH PEACE

    For starters, proposals that Ukraine give up territory to Russian control create a moral hazard. The war in Ukraine is not akin to an eighteenth- or nineteenth-century conflict in which a province might be handed from one country to another without catastrophic consequences for most of the people who live there. Russian President Vladimir Putin’s war is a war of national extermination. He has made no secret of his aim to destroy Ukraine’s cultural and national identity. In the parts of Ukraine they occupy, Russian forces have established “filtration camps” where they question Ukrainians and deport them against their will to Russia. They have committed mass killings and rapes. They have destroyed Ukrainian culture, targeting historical sites, looting museums, and burning books. These tactics are reminiscent of the Stalinist methods employed against Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania in 1940, when the Soviets occupied the Baltic states and sought to erase national identity through mass deportations and forced Russification. Russia’s crimes in Ukraine today are not excesses of war committed in the heat of battle but expressions of national policy.

    Those who call on Ukraine to give up territory therefore need to own up to the consequences. Millions of people would never return to their homes. Thousands of civilians would be killed, tortured, and raped. Children would be taken from their parents. The Ukrainians remaining under Russian occupation would be stripped of their national identity and placed under permanent, hostile submission. Professors, teachers, writers, journalists, civic leaders, local activists, and anyone else with what Putin has termed a “Nazi” (read: Ukrainian) identity would probably be harassed and perhaps imprisoned or deported. Accepting further Russian occupation of Ukraine would mean accepting these inevitable moral and ethical consequences. The atrocities would not stop if the fighting ended. To the contrary, surrendering territory to achieve a peace dictated by Moscow would vindicate such tactics and lock in their consequences forever.

    JUST A BAND-AID

    Advocates of a diplomatic settlement are also unrealistic about its long-term implications for European peace, security, and deterrence. Underlying their proposals is the assumption that a negotiated settlement now would lead to a permanent solution in which Ukraine gives up the territory now under Russian occupation—namely, Crimea, Luhansk, Donetsk, and perhaps Kherson and other territories—and an independent rump state would develop freely to pursue its ambitions of European integration. The idea is to emulate past settlements in which territory was partitioned and stability ensued, such as the division of Germany in 1945 and the Korean armistice of 1953. 

    But Ukraine is a profoundly different case. Since his February 24 speech that launched the war, Putin has made explicit in word and deed that he intends to destroy Ukrainian independence writ large. A settlement that surrenders some Ukrainian territory to Russia is unlikely to end Russia’s desires to deny Ukraine true nationhood. The Soviet Union accepted West Germany as a sovereign country during the Cold War, but Putin would never do the same for Ukraine, which he fundamentally does not see as an independent nation.

    The Russian-occupied areas of Ukraine, for their part, would in no way resemble East Germany. The Soviets sought to make that country the beacon of state socialism. They wanted it to be communist and under their control, not eliminated or Russified. Even if Russia wanted to rebuild the Donbas or any other part of Ukraine it occupies, it doesn’t have the resources to do so. If ceded to Russia, these territories—already leveled to the ground—would remain no man’s lands: zones of lawlessness and human rights abuses.

    A divided Ukraine would not resemble the Korean armistice, either. In that case, on the northern side of the 38th parallel, millions of people suffer under a totalitarian dictatorship while to the south, 50 million South Koreans enjoy freedom, well-being, and a measure of security. But as long as Russia occupies parts of Ukraine, it will seek to undermine any independent Ukrainian government through force, political subversion, and economic pressure.

    Russian President Vladimir Putin’s war is a war of national extermination.

    Another important difference: to the extent that both the German and Korean solutions worked, they did so thanks to U.S. security guarantees and U.S. troops. West Germany was made a member of NATO, South Korea signed a U.S. defense treaty, and both countries hosted tens of thousands of U.S. troops. In the case of Ukraine, extending NATO membership to the country could in theory back up a territorial settlement. Absent NATO membership, one could imagine a different set of reassurances that could also provide the security underpinnings for long-term stability for a sort of West Ukraine. The United States might, for example, station troops in Ukraine on a long-term basis, and it (and perhaps other countries, as well) might offer a security guarantee on the level of NATO’s Article 5 or the U.S.–South Korean bilateral defense arrangements. But such guarantees remain unlikely.

    Western Europe seems no more willing to provide Article 5 guarantees to Ukraine than it did at the 2008 Bucharest summit, where members settled on Ukrainian NATO membership as a long-term objective but laid out no meaningful path to achieve it. Based on our conversations with officials in the Biden administration, even the United States does not seem ready to offer Ukraine security guarantees akin to what it offered West Germany or what it offers South Korea; instead, it is planning to continue to offer only arms and intelligence. Moreover, the Kremlin is likely to insist that any settlement with Ukraine include Ukrainian commitments to give up NATO membership in favor of some sort of neutrality, along with a pledge not to base foreign troops. In any case, those urging Ukraine to surrender territory seldom back up their preferred settlement by insisting that the country be welcomed into NATO or given hard security guarantees by the United States. These omissions inspire little confidence that such proposals are realistic.

    At best, Russian-occupied Ukraine would be the site of another so-called frozen conflict, but even that concept is a misnomer and illusion. Frozen conflicts imply a stable permanency, but they are anything but that. As was the case with Luhansk and Donetsk, where the invasion began, gray zones often become launching pads for greater aggression. Moscow’s occupation of Crimea, another so-called frozen conflict, has allowed Russian forces to impose an economic blockade, cutting off vital agricultural exports from Ukraine and igniting a global food crisis. Creating more such gray zones in Ukraine might produce a tenuous short-term stop to the fighting, but as recent history has shown, they would also enable the Kremlin to use these territories to destabilize Ukraine and Europe and rebuild its strength.

    BAD INTENTIONS

    The diplomatic solution proposed by Italy, to its credit, does not insist on a unilateral Ukrainian surrender of territory. The four-part framework includes a cease-fire and demilitarization; Ukrainian neutrality plus security guarantees; autonomy for Crimea and the Donbas, with both remaining as part of Ukraine; and withdrawal of Russian forces combined with lifting of sanctions. Judging by its public statements in the early weeks of the war, Ukraine might accept something like these terms if they could be realized.

    But they are not likely to be. For one thing, in 2013, the Kremlin already had a good deal in Ukraine: the country was officially neutral, its security relations with the West were minimal, and Putin’s man, Viktor Yanukovych, was its president. Evidently, that wasn’t good enough for Putin: he forced Yanukovych to reject a modest trade agreement with the European Union and thus precipitated a democratic uprising. In the years since, Putin’s appetite has only grown. Predictably, Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov has already dismissed the Italian proposal.  

    Even if the Kremlin announced tomorrow that it accepted a diplomatic framework as the basis for negotiation, there would be good reason to remain skeptical of its chances. The Italian deal, for example, is similar to the now defunct Minsk agreements, which started with a cease-fire, included local control for the Donbas, and ended with restoration of Ukraine’s eastern international boundary. Russia did not take Minsk seriously as anything but a platform to escalate demands. It is unlikely to treat a diplomatic proposal any better today.

    Anyone who still has faith in Moscow’s intention to take such frameworks seriously should study its behavior in Syria, where the Russians treated every arrangement as an opportunity to advance its position on the ground. For any negotiations to work, all parties at the table must want a solution, be sincerely engaged in the process, and abide by the ultimate compromise. Putin has shown an inclination to do none of that so far, and he is unlikely to change his behavior as long as he sees any pathway to a win in Ukraine.

    TOO EARLY FOR AN ENDGAME

    Western policymakers must accept a harsh truth in Ukraine: the war is likely to grind on for some time. At this point in the conflict, the West should think less about what Ukraine should give to Russia and how to avoid humiliating Putin and more about what it can do to put Ukraine in the best possible position. The ultimate argument of those who wish Ukraine to unilaterally surrender land is that the country cannot prevail in the war—that as The New York Times editorial board put it, regaining territory “is not a realistic goal.”

    But those who doubt Ukraine’s capabilities should consider how much the country has accomplished so far. Just as initial assumptions of a quick Russian victory were wrong, current assumptions of a slow but unstoppable Russian advance may be off, too. Ukrainian offensives to regain territory in the south and east of the country may prove difficult. But Russia, with its limited forces, may not be able to hold all the territory it has taken. Nobody knows what the fortunes of war may bring. In private conversations with the two of us, senior U.S. military and civilian officials have shared mixed views of how the battle is likely to go and acknowledged that they are uncertain themselves. Uncertainty is a questionable basis on which to make weighty decisions that have baleful consequences for millions of people—decisions such as urging Ukraine to give up territory or pressuring it to stop fighting. At this stage, there is no basis to allow Putin to win at the negotiating table what he has failed to achieve on the battlefield. 

    The goal for the West is not to convince or pressure Ukraine to give up.

    Ukrainian military success is not inevitable. But it is possible. Putin will not be impressed by firm speeches from Western leaders. What he may well respect, however, is a defeat on the ground, which could convince him to negotiate a settlement that he could portray through his propaganda machine as a victory. Putin is counting on the West to lose patience in a long war and capitulate as energy and food prices rise. And although the Russian people are famed for their ability to endure hardship, they were promised a quick “special military operation”—not years of conflict that make it difficult to live normal lives. Their patience will wear thinner if Russia loses on the battlefield.

    The United States, Europe, and Ukraine’s other friends have a responsibility to help Ukraine prevail commensurate with that possibility. The goal now for the West is to thwart an adversary—not to convince or pressure Ukraine to give up. That means sending more arms to Ukraine and putting more economic pressure on Russia.

    Such a plan does not rule out negotiations. Zelensky and his government have not done so. In fact, they showed more commitment to negotiations in the early weeks of the war than the Kremlin did. The time for negotiations may come—which is why the job now is to put Ukraine in the most favorable position possible in anticipation of that moment so that it has the best options available.

    As long as Ukrainians are willing to fight for their homeland and all of Europe, it is the West’s duty to support them. Peace may sound like an appealing talking point, but Ukrainians know that it cannot come at any price. Western policymakers should listen.

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  • The three great (existential) threats to Moscow – ilGiornale.it

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  • Putin Brought Dog to Meeting With Merkel

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    merkel putin

    Russian President Vladimir Putin, right, with German Chancellor Angela Merkel during a joint news conference in Moscow’s Kremlin on Nov.16, 2012. Throughout their relationship as world leaders, German Chancellor Angela Merkel and Russian President Vladimir Putin have shared an understanding. After all, Putin served as a KGB officer in Germany from 1985 to 1990.

    “When Putin and Merkel meet, they sometimes speak in German (he’s better in her language than she is in his), and Putin corrects his own interpreter to let Merkel know that nothing is lost on him,” George Packer of The New Yorker wrote in a profile of Merkel.

    “Putin’s brand of macho elicits in Merkel a kind of scientific empathy.”

    The profile shows how tensions between the two leaders have been brewing for several years, most recently with Russia’s incursions into Ukraine.

    During discussions about energy supplies at Putin’s home in Sochi back in 2007, the Russian president called his black lab, Koni, into the room with Merkel. From The New Yorker (emphasis added):

    “As the dog approached and sniffed her, Merkel froze, visibly frightened. She’d been bitten once, in 1995, and her fear of dogs couldn’t have escaped Putin, who sat back and enjoyed the moment, legs spread wide. ‘I’m sure it will behave itself,’ he said. Merkel had the presence of mind to reply, in Russian, ‘It doesn’t eat journalists, after all.’ …”

    “Later, Merkel interpreted Putin’s behavior. ‘I understand why he has to do this — to prove he’s a man,’ she told a group of reporters. ‘He’s afraid of his own weakness. Russia has nothing, no successful politics or economy. All they have is this.'”

     

    Vladimir Putin dog

    In 2007, Merkel met with Putin — and his dog Koni. The Kremlin has used animals to antagonize world leaders before. Putin once played the “my dog is bigger than your dog” game with then-President George W. Bush. The incident actually served as

    inspiration for one of Bush’s paintings

    The Russian president, who filmed his own instructional jiu-jitsu video, makes no secret of his physical prowess. Through various propaganda events portraying his manliness, Putin markets himself as a tough guy running an even tougher country.

    Christina Sterbenz contributed to this story.

     

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  • France and Germany ‘sold £230million of military hardware including bombs and missiles to Moscow’ | Daily Mail Online

    Source: France and Germany ‘sold £230million of military hardware including bombs and missiles to Moscow’ | Daily Mail Online

    France and Germany sold £230million worth of military hardware to Moscow which was likely used in Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, according to an EU analysis.

    It should have been impossible to do so owing to an EU embargo that banned selling arms to Russia following the 2014 annexation of Crimea.

    Last month, it was discovered that France, Germany and Italy used a loophole in the ban.

    They were just three of at least 10 EU member states to export almost €350million (£293million) in equipment that included missiles, rockets, guns and bombs.

    It was reported by The Telegraph that 78 per cent of this total was supplied by French and German firms.

    Service members of pro-Russian troops are seen atop of an armoured vehicle during Ukraine-Russia conflict in the southern port city of Mariupol

     

    Service members of pro-Russian troops are seen atop of an armoured vehicle during Ukraine-Russia conflict in the southern port city of Mariupol

     

    The EU banned ‘the direct or indirect sale, supply, transfer or export of arms and related material of all types, including weapons and ammunition, military vehicles and equipment, paramilitary equipment, and spare parts therefore, to Russia’ eight years ago.

    However, countries were able to sell hundreds of millions of pounds worth of kit to Russia despite the ban using a backdoor technicality that permitted contracts signed before August 1, 2014, or additional contracts that would help conclude those deals.

    France was responsible for making €152 million in sales as part of 76 export licences.

    Earlier this month, it was revealed that the European Union had sent almost €1billion to Russia each day for energy since the war in Ukraine began.

    German Chancellor Olaf Scholz has faced sharp criticism for failing to deliver heavy weapons to the besieged country, such as tanks and howitzers, to fend off savage Russian attacks.

    The leader said he feared that providing Ukraine with tanks could spark a nuclear war.

    German Chancellor Olaf Scholz says he fears providing Ukraine with tanks could spark a nuclear war

     

    German Chancellor Olaf Scholz says he fears providing Ukraine with tanks could spark a nuclear war

    Other Western allies have stepped up their military shipments to Volodymyr Zelensky‘s forces but Scholz has held firm in his bid not to upset Vladimir Putin.

    Instead, on Tuesday, he said Germany would provide Ukraine with £830million to buy their own weapons.

    Asked in an extensive interview published on Friday why he thought delivering tanks could lead to nuclear war, he said there was no rule book that stated when Germany could be considered a party to the war in Ukraine.

    It comes as Russia revealed plans to seize Ukraine’s entire southern coast and hinted at future military action in Moldova to protect ‘oppressed’ Russian speakers.

    Other Western allies have stepped up their military shipments to Volodymyr Zelensky 's forces but Scholz has held firm in his bid not to upset Vladimir Putin

     

    Other Western allies have stepped up their military shipments to Volodymyr Zelensky ‘s forces but Scholz has held firm in his bid not to upset Vladimir Putin

    The deputy commander of Russia’s central military district, Rustam Minnekayev, said Russia planned to forge a corridor between Crimea, the Black Sea peninsula which Russia annexed in 2014, and the Donbas in eastern Ukraine.

    The suggestion by a senior Russian official that Moscow needs to defend supporters in a nearby country is a chilling echo of its previous justification for invading Ukraine.

    It would mean an extended war to the west of annexed Crimea, where Putin’s sea power is diminished after the sinking of the Moskva.

    Russian forces already occupy most of the territory there and, as Western officials have conceded, they are in a position to achieve their military objectives.

    It comes as Russia revealed plans to seize Ukraine¿s entire southern coast and hinted at future military action in Moldova to protect ¿oppressed¿ Russian speakers

     

    It comes as Russia revealed plans to seize Ukraine’s entire southern coast and hinted at future military action in Moldova to protect ‘oppressed’ Russian speakers

    Boris Johnson said the UK is looking at sending British tanks to Poland – after it was revealed Ukrainian troops are in Britain being trained for the first time since the start of the Russian invasion.

    Speaking during a news conference in New Delhi, where he held talks with Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi, the Prime Minister today said the Government was contemplating sending Challenger 2 tanks to eastern Europe to replace Soviet-era T-72 tanks the Poles are shipping to Ukraine.

    Mr Johnson told reporters: ‘I think perhaps what I haven’t said publicly before is we’re also looking more at what we can do to backfill in countries such as Poland who may want to send heavier weaponry to help defend the Ukrainians.

    ‘So we’re looking at sending tanks to Poland to help them as they sending some of their T-72s to Ukraine.’

    The Challenger 2 tank has been the mainstay of the British Army since the 1990s and saw action in the Iraq War. The 64-tonne vehicles are due to go out of service in 2025, but the Army still has a fleet of more than 200.

    The Challenger 2 tank has been the mainstay of the British Army since the 1990s and saw action in the Iraq War. The 64-tonne vehicles are due to go out of service in 2025, but the Army still has a fleet of more than 200

     

    The Challenger 2 tank has been the mainstay of the British Army since the 1990s and saw action in the Iraq War. The 64-tonne vehicles are due to go out of service in 2025, but the Army still has a fleet of more than 200

    Britain's Prime Minister Boris Johnson and his Indian counterpart Narendra Modi at Hyderabad House in New Delhi

     

    Britain’s Prime Minister Boris Johnson and his Indian counterpart Narendra Modi at Hyderabad House in New Delhi

     

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  • German coalition under strain: Why is Berlin not sending heavy weapons? | World News | WION – YouTube

    Source: German coalition under strain: Why is Berlin not sending heavy weapons? | World News | WION – YouTube

    In a recent update on the Ukraine-Russia conflict, Ukraine says the weapons they need are not on the German list. However, Germany says they’re open to sendi…

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  • Why is Mariupol so important in the Ukraine war? | World News | Sky News

    Source: Why is Mariupol so important in the Ukraine war? | World News | Sky News

    The industrial city holds great strategic and symbolic value for both sides in this conflict.

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Si consiglia al visione sul sisto originale: Sito SKYNEWS
COSA SI PUò FARE ORA ▼

Criticità della situazione:

Possibile scoppio di III Guerra mondiale (con armi nucleari).

Possibile espansione del dominio di Putin: può arrivare a costringere le altre Nazioni a sottomettersi alle sue policy.

.

La posta in gioco: non è l’annessione dell’Ukraine alla Russia, ma conseguenze più vaste: Putin può arrivare ad una posizione di supremazia  politica nei confronti dell’Europa (proseguendo nel suo piano di annessione territori sovrani confinanti).

.

Valutazione responsabilità:

- non si è valutato bene quando Putin - ultimi 20 anni - ha occupato altri territori sovrani (con crimini di guerra evidenti) <see>. E non non si è dotato l’Ukraine di opportuni strumenti di difesa (“difese passive”, che non possono essere considerate come pericolose da stati confinanti).

- oggi l’Occidente continua ad accontentarsi di una situazione di comfort immediato senza intervenire seriamente per impedire l’invasione della Ukraine, e quindi l’espansione del potere di Putin sull’Europa (sebbene sia possibile prendere misure più efficaci per indebolire Putin  senza provocare una nuova Guerra mondiale).

.

Stato di fatto: non si tratta di una guerra, ma di un Crimine contro l’umanità – quindi come tale va trattata <see>

.

Opportunità: Putin non cesserà mai la guerra (in Russia verrebbe distrutto). La questione è “porre fine alla sua carriera politica (in Russia) <span class="evidBORDsimple"inducendo chi oggi lo sostiene ad abbandonarlo  (Oligarchi, Popolo, alleati esteri).

======= FINE NEWS ===========

Si consiglia al visione sul sisto originale: Sito SKYNEWS
PREMESSE ▼

Criticità della situazione:

Possibile scoppio di III Guerra mondiale (con armi nucleari).

Possibile espansione del dominio di Putin: può arrivare a costringere le altre Nazioni a sottomettersi alle sue policy.

.

La posta in gioco: non è l’annessione dell’Ukraine alla Russia, ma conseguenze più vaste: Putin può arrivare ad una posizione di supremazia  politica nei confronti dell’Europa (proseguendo nel suo piano di annessione territori sovrani confinanti).

.

Valutazione responsabilità:

- non si è valutato bene quando Putin - ultimi 20 anni - ha occupato altri territori sovrani (con crimini di guerra evidenti) <see>. E non non si è dotato l’Ukraine di opportuni strumenti di difesa (“difese passive”, che non possono essere considerate come pericolose da stati confinanti).

- oggi l’Occidente continua ad accontentarsi di una situazione di comfort immediato senza intervenire seriamente per impedire l’invasione della Ukraine, e quindi l’espansione del potere di Putin sull’Europa (sebbene sia possibile prendere misure più efficaci per indebolire Putin  senza provocare una nuova Guerra mondiale).

.

Stato di fatto: non si tratta di una guerra, ma di un Crimine contro l’umanità – quindi come tale va trattata <see>

.

Opportunità: Putin non cesserà mai la guerra (in Russia verrebbe distrutto). La questione è “porre fine alla sua carriera politica (in Russia) <span class="evidBORDsimple"inducendo chi oggi lo sostiene ad abbandonarlo  (Oligarchi, Popolo, alleati esteri).

COSA C'È
IN BALLO
LE STRATEGIE
DELLE PARTI
|VALUTAZIONI
- RIFLESSIONI
ERRORI
COMMESSI
SVILUPPI
ASSESTMENT
che cosa
TO DO
che cosa
NOT TO DO

Quali sono fattori da considerare per valutare in modo corretto la situazione nel conflitto Russia Ukraine.

1) non è la questione di una guerra tra Russia e Ukraine, ma di come si può evolvere l’”espansionismo” (militare e politico) di Putin (che se attuasse i suoi piani, verrebbe a “sottomettere” politicamente il resto dell’Europa).

Inoltre si deve tener conto della situazione internazionale: La russia fa parte dell’”asse” con China ed Iran, che hanno fatto prima della gueerra in Ukraina esercitazioni militari comuni.

La Nazioni non sembrano comprendere come in Ukraine si stia giocando .. una condizione .. geo-politica in gran parte compromessa da tempo (per la quale molto si può ancora fare e non viene fatto)

sia in gioco molto di più di una .. .. questione militare: si tratta di una situazione di Geo-politica (in effetti oggi è ormai troppo tardi per certi interventi, ma

Il problema di fondo sembra essere che oggi si è persa le memoria del passato: delle dittature del ‘900 che per molto tempo sono state in grado di dominare il mondo portando disgrazie per tutte le nazioni .. (per liberarsi del Nazismo sono morti 50 milioni di persone <source>, e l’Unione sovietica ha provocato nell’Europa orientale più di 80 milioni di morti di civili <source>). <vedi arcitolo “■ ■ RIFERIMENTI DEL PASSATO – PERDITA DI MEMORIA STORICA”>

Oggi sembra cioè essersi perduta la capacità di valutare il fattore costi/benefici di una si situazione: si scelgono i vantaggi immediati (nell’illusione di avere una condizione di pace offerta dall’idea di non essere coinvolti in una guerra). E non si è in grado di vedere le minacce delle conseguenze di tale scelta nel lungo periodo (esattamente come si è fatto con Hitler nelle fasi iniziali di espansione della Germania <vedi riferimenti storici>

{cap riferimenti}

.

2) il punto critico è che si può arrivare ad una Guerra nucleare. In base a quanto affermato Putin <source>, ed al suo profilo .. può essere uno che attacca <vedi tab e articolo su personaggi>.

Il problema è che .. … ora è molto più difficile intervenire per scongiurare l’invasione di Putin, e quindi la sua possibile ulteriore espansione verso i paesi del Baltico <vedi “dove si è sbagliato”> <vedi .. baltico>.

È quindi necessario valutare con attenzione cosa si può ancora fare” (ma il problema è che .. la maggior parte delle nazioni .. non si rendo conto che fino ad ora si è fatto troppo poco, e che la questione è il fattore tempo è determinante .. ).

Stategie .. goals .. strumentali e finali .

Russia ..
Goal nell’immediato:

- chiudere l’acceso al mare dell’Ukraine.

- introdurre milizie irregolari (“guerra sporca”, crimine di guerra) e passare ad una fase di Urban war, combattendo popolazione ed esercito con tecniche di guerriglia,

  1. «< transizione tra la guerra tradizionale e la “guerra sporca” pura con l’arrivo di milizie
Goal nel lungo periodo:

- strategie medioevali degli assedi .. prendere le persone per fame (e sete, freddo, buio) ..

- decimare la popolazione (o fare in modo che lasci il Paese) (bombardamenti ed uso delle milizie irregolari .. <vedi> per poter .. eliminare la parte della popolazione che può opporre resistenza in una successiva fase di .. governo fantoccio ..

avere il sostengo della popolazione rimasta ..

Ukraina:
Goal nell’immediato:

È costretta a combattere fino all’ultima .. per non finire nelle mani della Russia …. (non può permettersi di capitolare, sarebbe finita per sempre, diventanto un governo satellite della Russia (con un governo fantoccio, come quello che la Russia era riuscito ad instaurare (le intelligence dicono che Putin vorrebbe mettere il precedente presidente di Putin, poi fatto scappare dal popolo, Yanukovych. <vedi link Yanu, Rivol, allarme.. ***>

L’Ukraine deve assolutamente evitare di “perdere la guerra”, protrarre il conflitto .. più tempo sossibile .. (evitare assassinion del Presidente, abbattimento del morale (a causa delle .. con bombrdamenti .. , mancanza di cibo, medicine, luce elettrica, ricaldamento, medicine ed ospedali), con conseguenti fuga (e morti) delle persone che potrebbero . ,

L’Ukraine deve poter essere in grado di difendersi in un Urban warfare, e trasformare la guerra in un nuovo Afganistan (. Vietnam), dove i Russi si sono dovuti ritirare.

Per questo ..

  1. e con armamenti leggeri (missili terra-aria ed anticarro, droni, fucili, ecc . ) .. porta .. l’esercito russo ad una fase di stallo .. (con complicaioni dell a posizione di Putin in patria e con gli alleati).
Goal nel lungo periodo:
  1. VALUTAZIONE …. della questione ..

Per comprendere quali sono le opportunità per il fronte anti-Russia, e come si possa agire nel conflitto bisogna considerare che.

non si tratta di un conflitto locale singola guerra, ma di un processo di espansione della Russia con occupazioni di territori (ex.USSR) di cui l’Ukraina non è che una tappa (ha già .. paesi baltici), il che porterebbe molto probabilmente ad un nuovo Reich ..

In questo processo la posta in gioco non è l’annessione dell’Ukraine alla Russia, ma conseguenze più vaste che .. interessano tutto il Mondo: Putin può arrivare ad una posizione di supremazia politica nei confronti dell’Europa (proseguendo nel suo piano di annessione territori sovrani confinanti).

=

● non è una questione di una vittoria militare di .. Putin poiché non ammetterà mai che l’esercito russo è stato sconfitto (in Russia verrebbe distrutto). Ora dimostra di voler continuare con una “guerra sporca” .. con milizie irregolari (ed illegali: crimini di guerra).

La questione quindi è di mettere è “porre fine alla sua carriera politica (in Russia) inducendo chi oggi lo sostiene ad abbandonarlo  (Oligarchi, Popolo, alleati esteri). Ma per arrivare .. a ciò .. è necessario .. supportare l’esercito ukraino .. affinthè non si arrivi alla capitolazione dell’Ukraina. (e farlo in tempo). Capitolazione .. che rischia di essere . .. un punto del non ritorno .

  • Si tratta di .. how fast .. si aiutano ..

=

Si tratta non di una guerra ma di un Crimine contro l’umanità – e quindi .. può essere condannato in sede legale (è già aperto un procedimento alla International Court of Justice <see original article “International court of justice to fast-track ruling on Russian invasion | Ukraine | The Guardian”>. Cosa che gli creerebbe ulteriori problemi non solo con il fronte anti-Russia, ma anche con gli alleati.

Non si è intervenuti per fermare l’espansione della Russia di Putin con l’”annessione” di territori confinanti (espansione in atto da 20 anni, con atrocità commesse evidenti). Ed all’inizio dell’invasione si non si è fatto abbastanza per fermare l’intervento militare della Russia.

Considerazioni ………...

Si è perduta la memoria del passato:

del percorso che ha fatto Hitler per dominare il Mondo proprio cominciando ad occupare territori esterni alla Germania con il beneplacito delle altre Nazioni.

Prorpio come sta facendo ora Putin, con gli stessi pretesti .. ha occupato Austria, Cecoslovacchia e poi Polonia (assieme all’Unione Sovietica prima che le altre Nazioni si rendessero conto del reale pericolo ..

● di come l’Unione sovietica abbia soggiogato le nazioni confinanti senza che le altre Nazioni glielo impedissero (nonostante i Crimini contro l’umanità .. )

Proprio come ha fatto ora, con Ungheria, Cecoslovacchia, ..

.. errore di valutazione della questione dei rapporti di putin con il mondo

In base a tali esperienze (dimenticate) si sarebbe dovuti intervenire prima dell’inizio dell’invasione dell’Ukraine. <<vedi “le cose che si possono fare”>>

Ad esempio si sarebbe dovuto dotare l’Ukraine di un sistema di missili “di difesa”, in grado di intercettare i missili ora utilizzati ora per distruggere le città.

Si ricorda che anche . Volendo ragionare in termini di .. “utilitarismo politico” (egoistici) .. cercare di star fuori dal conflitto per avere una (illusoria) condizione di pace, in realtà in tale modo si favorisce una condizione peggiore nel medio-lungo periodo ..

=

E l’Occidente continua .. nell’errore .. non supportando a sufficienza l’Ukraine nella guerra (è una questione di lotta conto il tempo, .. nella quale .. la capitolazione dell’Ukraina può essere un punto di non ritorno).

In sintesi

Putin non può perdere la guerra

(se il resto del Mondo, come sembra, non aiuta direttamente l’Ukraine): egli non deciderà mai di ritirarsi dall’Ukraine, perché sarebbe finito (perdendo il suo potere in Russia).

Ovvero Putin può essere vinto non in Ukraine, ma in un più vasto scenario nel quale egli sta sviluppando un incremento del suo potere geo-politico (di espansione territoriale della Russia, e dominio delle Nazioni che divengono sempre più dipendenti dalla Russia per l’energia).

Si tratta quindi di

agire con cautele,
ma in modo efficace e tempestivo

(si tratta una lotta contro il tempo):

► il punto di base è di non provocare una guerra tra Russia e resto del mondo (NATO), ma è contenere la situazione in ukraine sino a che diviene possibile una soluzione “politica” (non necessariamente “diplomatica”) - il problema è la minaccia di Putin di ricorrere alla guerra nucleare, che potrebbe essere un bluff, ma è rischioso .. verificare). Si tratta di

Operare su un livello “politico” all’interno della Russia, e nei rapporti internazionali di Putin.

Ossia si tratta di operare sul piano politico delle relazioni di Putin con chi sostiene il suo Potere:

● POLITICA INTERNA: fare in modo che Putin sia finito in Russia.

- mettendogli contro il Popolo russo: ad esempio con sempre maggiori proteste, e perdita di consenso elettorale (ci sono le elezioni nel 2024)

- facendogli perdere il supporto politico e finanziario di “personaggi di corte” come e gli Oligarchi: il risultato potrebbe anche essere una sua eliminazione come ha fatto l’Italia con Mussolini (imprigionato) o la Germania con Hitler (attentato riuscito solo in parte). <<vedi articolo su Oligarchi>>

● GEO-POLITCA ESTERA: costringendo gli attuali alleati ad abbandonare il supporto di Putin come è accaduto, in parte, già dai primi insuccessi militari in Ukraine con la Cina.

che é possibile fare:

- sanzioni ed embarghi

- inviare armi

- …..

non si possono fare

- intervenire direttamente nella guerra (compreso .. no fly zone

«<< approf. Article .. ogni regola ha una sanzione .. significherebbe mettere dei “poliziotti” che internengono nel caso della violazione ..

-

la .. soluzione temporanea è ..

Impedire la conquista della Capitale Kiev (e l’assassinio del Presidente Zelenskyy ) in modo che rimanga aperta la guerra tra i due Eserciti (che l’Ukraina non capitoli dal punto di vista istituzionale). Per fre ciò:

feedzi

[feedzy-rss feeds="http://feeds.feedburner.com/foxnews/latest"] = === FILTERED ===== keywords_title [feedzy-rss feeds="http://feeds.feedburner.com/foxnews/latest" keywords_inc_on="title" keywords_title="ukraine"]
Si consiglia al visione sul sito originale: Sito aljazeera.com

(sospeso, 2° di tabs, rimetti in alto)

LE RAGIONI
[PREMESSE
STORICHE?]
[GLI STEPS
TIMELINE]
LE PARTI

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Lorem ipsum dolor sit amet, consectetur adipiscing elit. Aenean rhoncus diam metus, non posuere lectus interdum egestas. Duis aliquet id lacus vel tristique. Fusce rutrum ex in sapien laoreet, eu imperdiet nisi ullamcorper. Vestibulum nec feugiat nisi. Sed ac orci aliquam, auctor arcu nec, sagittis purus. Fusce viverra, ipsum et varius congue, felis ipsum molestie tellus, non egestas diam massa vel nisl. Pellentesque congue sagittis elementum. Suspendisse quis nisi sollicitudin, maximus elit ac, ornare nunc. Suspendisse feugiat egestas ante, nec interdum lacus. Fusce ut fringilla ex, ut mollis est. Maecenas hendrerit risus sollicitudin gravida venenatis. Fusce semper nunc ac nulla lacinia tempor. Sed efficitur, libero eu tempus rhoncus, enim elit laoreet nunc, nec convallis quam dolor nec velit. Maecenas mattis, enim pulvinar tristique rutrum, diam nulla fringilla dolor, vitae aliquam diam dolor non dolor. Ut ut sem ante. Phasellus orci nunc, rutrum id feugiat in, semper id arcu.

CREDO DI NO, A PARTE, O NO?

Lorem ipsum dolor sit amet, consectetur adipiscing elit. Aenean rhoncus diam metus, non posuere lectus interdum egestas. Duis aliquet id lacus vel tristique. Fusce rutrum ex in sapien laoreet, eu imperdiet nisi ullamcorper. Vestibulum nec feugiat nisi. Sed ac orci aliquam, auctor arcu nec, sagittis purus. Fusce viverra, ipsum et varius congue, felis ipsum molestie tellus, non egestas diam massa vel nisl. Pellentesque congue sagittis elementum. Suspendisse quis nisi sollicitudin, maximus elit ac, ornare nunc. Suspendisse feugiat egestas ante, nec interdum lacus. Fusce ut fringilla ex, ut mollis est. Maecenas hendrerit risus sollicitudin gravida venenatis. Fusce semper nunc ac nulla lacinia tempor. Sed efficitur, libero eu tempus rhoncus, enim elit laoreet nunc, nec convallis quam dolor nec velit. Maecenas mattis, enim pulvinar tristique rutrum, diam nulla fringilla dolor, vitae aliquam diam dolor non dolor. Ut ut sem ante. Phasellus orci nunc, rutrum id feugiat in, semper id arcu.

Lorem ipsum dolor sit amet, consectetur adipiscing elit. Aenean rhoncus diam metus, non posuere lectus interdum egestas. Duis aliquet id lacus vel tristique. Fusce rutrum ex in sapien laoreet, eu imperdiet nisi ullamcorper. Vestibulum nec feugiat nisi. Sed ac orci aliquam, auctor arcu nec, sagittis purus. Fusce viverra, ipsum et varius congue, felis ipsum molestie tellus, non egestas diam massa vel nisl. Pellentesque congue sagittis elementum. Suspendisse quis nisi sollicitudin, maximus elit ac, ornare nunc. Suspendisse feugiat egestas ante, nec interdum lacus. Fusce ut fringilla ex, ut mollis est. Maecenas hendrerit risus sollicitudin gravida venenatis. Fusce semper nunc ac nulla lacinia tempor. Sed efficitur, libero eu tempus rhoncus, enim elit laoreet nunc, nec convallis quam dolor nec velit. Maecenas mattis, enim pulvinar tristique rutrum, diam nulla fringilla dolor, vitae aliquam diam dolor non dolor. Ut ut sem ante. Phasellus orci nunc, rutrum id feugiat in, semper id arcu.

aaa

ORIGINARE SUPERATO COMPLETO

|STRATEGIE
|COSA C'È
IN BALLO
|VALUTAZIONI
- RIFLESSIONI
LE PARTI
LE RAGIONI
|ERRORI
[PREMESSE
STORICHE?]
[GLI STEPS
TIMELINE]

Stategie .. goals .. strumentali e finali .

Russia ..
Goal nell’immediato:

- chiudere l’acceso al mare dell’Ukraine.

- introdurre milizie irregolari (“guerra sporca”, crimine di guerra) e passare ad una fase di Urban war, combattendo popolazione ed esercito con tecniche di guerriglia,

  1. «< transizione tra la guerra tradizionale e la “guerra sporca” pura con l’arrivo di milizie
Goal nel lungo periodo:

- strategie medioevali degli assedi .. prendere le persone per fame (e sete, freddo, buio) ..

- decimare la popolazione (o fare in modo che lasci il Paese) (bombardamenti ed uso delle milizie irregolari .. <vedi> per poter .. eliminare la parte della popolazione che può opporre resistenza in una successiva fase di .. governo fantoccio ..

avere il sostengo della popolazione rimasta ..

Ukraina:
Goal nell’immediato:

È costretta a combattere fino all’ultima .. per non finire nelle mani della Russia …. (non può permettersi di capitolare, sarebbe finita per sempre, diventanto un governo satellite della Russia (con un governo fantoccio, come quello che la Russia era riuscito ad instaurare (le intelligence dicono che Putin vorrebbe mettere il precedente presidente di Putin, poi fatto scappare dal popolo, Yanukovych. <vedi link Yanu, Rivol, allarme.. ***>

L’Ukraine deve assolutamente evitare di “perdere la guerra”, protrarre il conflitto .. più tempo sossibile .. (evitare assassinion del Presidente, abbattimento del morale (a causa delle .. con bombrdamenti .. , mancanza di cibo, medicine, luce elettrica, ricaldamento, medicine ed ospedali), con conseguenti fuga (e morti) delle persone che potrebbero . ,

L’Ukraine deve poter essere in grado di difendersi in un Urban warfare, e trasformare la guerra in un nuovo Afganistan (. Vietnam), dove i Russi si sono dovuti ritirare.

Per questo ..

  1. e con armamenti leggeri (missili terra-aria ed anticarro, droni, fucili, ecc . ) .. porta .. l’esercito russo ad una fase di stallo .. (con complicaioni dell a posizione di Putin in patria e con gli alleati).
Goal nel lungo periodo:

Cosa c’è da considerare .. criticità ..
Quali sono i punti .. fattori .. da considerare per valutare la situazione

Vedi approfondim ..

La posta in gioco:

  1. LA POSTA IN GIOCO .. COSA C’è IN GIOCO . (o H5)

1) non è la questione di una guerra tra Russia e Ukraina, ma di come si può evolvere l’”espansionismo” (militare e politico) di Putin (se attuasse i suoi piani, verrebbe a “sottomettere” politicamente il resto dell’Europa).

Inoltre si deve tener conto della situazione internazionale: La russia fa parte dell’”asse” con China ed Iran, che hanno fatto prima della gueerra in Ukraina esercitazioni militari comuni.

La gente le Nazioni non sembrano comprendere come .. in Ukraine sia in gioco molti di più della guerra (in effetti oggi è orami troppo tardi per certi interventi, ma molto si può ancora fare e non viene fatto)

Oggi .. si è persa le memoria del passato, delle dittature del ‘900 che per molto tempo sono state in grado di dominare il mondo portando (il Nazismo sull’Europa, e l’Unione sovietica sull’eropa occidentale facendo almeno 80 milioni di morti di civili).

Si è cioè perduta la capacità di valutare .. il fattore costi/benefici di una scleta: si sceglie per .. vantaggi immediati (nell’illusione di pace .. che c’è nello .. stare fori dallo stress che causa .. la guerra) .. e non si è grando di vedere le minacce nel lungo perioro . (esattamente come si è fatto con Hitler nelle fasi inziali di espoansione .. <see>

  1. Si ricorda che anche . Utilitaristici .. farsi i fatti propri, .. che nel medio lungo periodo sono fatti propri anche l’invazione dell’Ukraina. Si è scelto di .. vivere in una illusione di pace .. invece di considerare .. le effettive conseguenze nel prossimo futuoro ..

«<<<< la qeustione è .. la minaccia di peggioramento .. quale è la minaccia di peggioramento della situazione ?

Ma vedono solo le minacce immediate .. e quidni è rovinoso ..

https://www.marshallcenter.org/en/publications/security-insights/baltic-states-targets-and-levers-role-region-russian-strategy-0

.

2) il punto critico è che si può arrivare ad una Guerra nucleare. IN base al suo profilo .. può essere uno che attacca … ora è molto più difficel per scongiurare le invazioni di Putin, .. <vedi “dove si è sbagliato”> e “cosa si può ancora fare”

  1. VALUTAZIONE …. della questione ..

Per comprendere quali sono le opportunità per il fronte anti-Russia, e come si possa agire nel conflitto bisogna considerare che.

non si tratta di un conflitto locale singola guerra, ma di un processo di espansione della Russia con occupazioni di territori (ex.USSR) di cui l’Ukraina non è che una tappa (ha già .. paesi baltici), il che porterebbe molto probabilmente ad un nuovo Reich ..

In questo processo la posta in gioco non è l’annessione dell’Ukraine alla Russia, ma conseguenze più vaste che .. interessano tutto il Mondo: Putin può arrivare ad una posizione di supremazia politica nei confronti dell’Europa (proseguendo nel suo piano di annessione territori sovrani confinanti).

=

● non è una questione di una vittoria militare di .. Putin poiché non ammetterà mai che l’esercito russo è stato sconfitto (in Russia verrebbe distrutto). Ora dimostra di voler continuare con una “guerra sporca” .. con milizie irregolari (ed illegali: crimini di guerra).

La questione quindi è di mettere è “porre fine alla sua carriera politica (in Russia) inducendo chi oggi lo sostiene ad abbandonarlo  (Oligarchi, Popolo, alleati esteri). Ma per arrivare .. a ciò .. è necessario .. supportare l’esercito ukraino .. affinthè non si arrivi alla capitolazione dell’Ukraina. (e farlo in tempo). Capitolazione .. che rischia di essere . .. un punto del non ritorno .

  • Si tratta di .. how fast .. si aiutano ..

=

Si tratta non di una guerra ma di un Crimine contro l’umanità – e quindi .. può essere condannato in sede legale (è già aperto un procedimento alla International Court of Justice <see original article “International court of justice to fast-track ruling on Russian invasion | Ukraine | The Guardian”>. Cosa che gli creerebbe ulteriori problemi non solo con il fronte anti-Russia, ma anche con gli alleati.

Lorem ipsum dolor sit amet, consectetur adipiscing elit. Aenean rhoncus diam metus, non posuere lectus interdum egestas. Duis aliquet id lacus vel tristique. Fusce rutrum ex in sapien laoreet, eu imperdiet nisi ullamcorper. Vestibulum nec feugiat nisi. Sed ac orci aliquam, auctor arcu nec, sagittis purus. Fusce viverra, ipsum et varius congue, felis ipsum molestie tellus, non egestas diam massa vel nisl. Pellentesque congue sagittis elementum. Suspendisse quis nisi sollicitudin, maximus elit ac, ornare nunc. Suspendisse feugiat egestas ante, nec interdum lacus. Fusce ut fringilla ex, ut mollis est. Maecenas hendrerit risus sollicitudin gravida venenatis. Fusce semper nunc ac nulla lacinia tempor. Sed efficitur, libero eu tempus rhoncus, enim elit laoreet nunc, nec convallis quam dolor nec velit. Maecenas mattis, enim pulvinar tristique rutrum, diam nulla fringilla dolor, vitae aliquam diam dolor non dolor. Ut ut sem ante. Phasellus orci nunc, rutrum id feugiat in, semper id arcu.

Lorem ipsum dolor sit amet, consectetur adipiscing elit. Aenean rhoncus diam metus, non posuere lectus interdum egestas. Duis aliquet id lacus vel tristique. Fusce rutrum ex in sapien laoreet, eu imperdiet nisi ullamcorper. Vestibulum nec feugiat nisi. Sed ac orci aliquam, auctor arcu nec, sagittis purus. Fusce viverra, ipsum et varius congue, felis ipsum molestie tellus, non egestas diam massa vel nisl. Pellentesque congue sagittis elementum. Suspendisse quis nisi sollicitudin, maximus elit ac, ornare nunc. Suspendisse feugiat egestas ante, nec interdum lacus. Fusce ut fringilla ex, ut mollis est. Maecenas hendrerit risus sollicitudin gravida venenatis. Fusce semper nunc ac nulla lacinia tempor. Sed efficitur, libero eu tempus rhoncus, enim elit laoreet nunc, nec convallis quam dolor nec velit. Maecenas mattis, enim pulvinar tristique rutrum, diam nulla fringilla dolor, vitae aliquam diam dolor non dolor. Ut ut sem ante. Phasellus orci nunc, rutrum id feugiat in, semper id arcu.

Errori* .. dove si è sbagliato ..

Tab aggiunto

Si è perduta la memoria del passato:

del percorso che ha fatto Hitler per dominare il Mondo proprio cominciando ad occupare territori esterni alla Germania con il beneplacito delle altre Nazioni.

Prorpio come sta facendo ora Putin, con gli stessi pretesti .. ha occupato Austria, Cecoslovacchia e poi polonia (assime all’Unione Sovietica prima che le altre Nazioni si rendessero conto del reale pericolo ..

● di come l’Unione sovietica abbia soggiogato le nazioni confinanti senza che le altre Nazioni glielo impedissero (nonostante i Crimini contro l’umanità .. )

Proprio come ha fatto ora, con Ungheria, Cecoslovacchia, ..

=

.. errore di .. valutazione .. mentale della questione ..

Si ricorda che anche . Volendo ragionare in termini di .. utilitarismo politico (egoistici) in realtà .. non .. Utilitaristici .. farsi i fatti propri, .. che nel medio lungo periodo sono fatti propri anche l’invazione dell’Ukraina. Si è scelto di .. vivere in una illusione di pace .. invece di considerare .. le effettive conseguenze nel prossimo futuoro ..

=

In base a tali esperienze (dimentaticate) si sarebbe dovuto intervenire .. prima dell’inizio dell’invazione dell’Ukraina.

  • si sarebbe dovuto fare: dare missili di difesa passiva” .. che intercettano gli altri missili .…

Lorem ipsum dolor sit amet, consectetur adipiscing elit. Aenean rhoncus diam metus, non posuere lectus interdum egestas. Duis aliquet id lacus vel tristique. Fusce rutrum ex in sapien laoreet, eu imperdiet nisi ullamcorper. Vestibulum nec feugiat nisi. Sed ac orci aliquam, auctor arcu nec, sagittis purus. Fusce viverra, ipsum et varius congue, felis ipsum molestie tellus, non egestas diam massa vel nisl. Pellentesque congue sagittis elementum. Suspendisse quis nisi sollicitudin, maximus elit ac, ornare nunc. Suspendisse feugiat egestas ante, nec interdum lacus. Fusce ut fringilla ex, ut mollis est. Maecenas hendrerit risus sollicitudin gravida venenatis. Fusce semper nunc ac nulla lacinia tempor. Sed efficitur, libero eu tempus rhoncus, enim elit laoreet nunc, nec convallis quam dolor nec velit. Maecenas mattis, enim pulvinar tristique rutrum, diam nulla fringilla dolor, vitae aliquam diam dolor non dolor. Ut ut sem ante. Phasellus orci nunc, rutrum id feugiat in, semper id arcu.

CREDO DI NO, A PARTE, O NO?

Lorem ipsum dolor sit amet, consectetur adipiscing elit. Aenean rhoncus diam metus, non posuere lectus interdum egestas. Duis aliquet id lacus vel tristique. Fusce rutrum ex in sapien laoreet, eu imperdiet nisi ullamcorper. Vestibulum nec feugiat nisi. Sed ac orci aliquam, auctor arcu nec, sagittis purus. Fusce viverra, ipsum et varius congue, felis ipsum molestie tellus, non egestas diam massa vel nisl. Pellentesque congue sagittis elementum. Suspendisse quis nisi sollicitudin, maximus elit ac, ornare nunc. Suspendisse feugiat egestas ante, nec interdum lacus. Fusce ut fringilla ex, ut mollis est. Maecenas hendrerit risus sollicitudin gravida venenatis. Fusce semper nunc ac nulla lacinia tempor. Sed efficitur, libero eu tempus rhoncus, enim elit laoreet nunc, nec convallis quam dolor nec velit. Maecenas mattis, enim pulvinar tristique rutrum, diam nulla fringilla dolor, vitae aliquam diam dolor non dolor. Ut ut sem ante. Phasellus orci nunc, rutrum id feugiat in, semper id arcu.

Criticità della situazione:

Possibile scoppio di III Guerra mondiale (con armi nucleari).

Possibile espansione del dominio di Putin: può arrivare a costringere le altre Nazioni a sottomettersi alle sue policy.

.

La posta in gioco: non è l’annessione dell’Ukraine alla Russia, ma conseguenze più vaste: Putin può arrivare ad una posizione di supremazia  politica nei confronti dell’Europa (proseguendo nel suo piano di annessione territori sovrani confinanti).

.

Valutazione responsabilità:

- non si è valutato bene quando Putin - ultimi 20 anni - ha occupato altri territori sovrani (con crimini di guerra evidenti) <see>. E non non si è dotato l’Ukraine di opportuni strumenti di difesa (“difese passive”, che non possono essere considerate come pericolose da stati confinanti).

- oggi l’Occidente continua ad accontentarsi di una situazione di comfort immediato senza intervenire seriamente per impedire l’invasione della Ukraine, e quindi l’espansione del potere di Putin sull’Europa (sebbene sia possibile prendere misure più efficaci per indebolire Putin  senza provocare una nuova Guerra mondiale).

.

Stato di fatto: non si tratta di una guerra, ma di un Crimine contro l’umanità – quindi come tale va trattata <see>

.

Opportunità: Putin non cesserà mai la guerra (in Russia verrebbe distrutto). La questione è “porre fine alla sua carriera politica (in Russia)  (Oligarchi, Popolo, alleati esteri).

acc

tit

Criticità della situazione:

Possibile scoppio di III Guerra mondiale (con armi nucleari).

Possibile espansione del dominio di Putin: può arrivare a costringere le altre Nazioni a sottomettersi alle sue policy.

.

La posta in gioco: non è l’annessione dell’Ukraine alla Russia, ma conseguenze più vaste: Putin può arrivare ad una posizione di supremazia  politica nei confronti dell’Europa (proseguendo nel suo piano di annessione territori sovrani confinanti).

.

Valutazione responsabilità:

- non si è valutato bene quando Putin - ultimi 20 anni - ha occupato altri territori sovrani (con crimini di guerra evidenti) <see>. E non non si è dotato l’Ukraine di opportuni strumenti di difesa (“difese passive”, che non possono essere considerate come pericolose da stati confinanti).

- oggi l’Occidente continua ad accontentarsi di una situazione di comfort immediato senza intervenire seriamente per impedire l’invasione della Ukraine, e quindi l’espansione del potere di Putin sull’Europa (sebbene sia possibile prendere misure più efficaci per indebolire Putin  senza provocare una nuova Guerra mondiale).

.

Stato di fatto: non si tratta di una guerra, ma di un Crimine contro l’umanità – quindi come tale va trattata <see>

.

Opportunità: Putin non cesserà mai la guerra (in Russia verrebbe distrutto). La questione è “porre fine alla sua carriera politica (in Russia) <span class="evidBORDsimple"inducendo chi oggi lo sostiene ad abbandonarlo  (Oligarchi, Popolo, alleati esteri).

[upgradable] Le strategie .. golas strumentali [bo a parte]

● Russia ..

Goal nell’immediato:

- chiudere l’acceso al mare dell’Ukraine.

- introdurre milizie irregolari (“guerra sporca”, crimine di guerra) e passare ad una fase di Urban war, combattendo popolazione ed esercito con tecniche di guerriglia,

«< transizione tra la guerra tradizionale e la “guerra sporca” pura con l’arrivo di milizie

Goal nel lungo periodo:

- strategie medioevale degli assedi .. prendere le persone per fame (e sete, freddo, buio) ..

- decimare la popolazione (o fare in modo che lasci il Paese) per poter .. eliminare la parte della popolazione che può opporre resistenza in una successiva fase di .. governo fantoccio ..

avere il sostengo della popolazione rimasta ..

● Ukraina:

disperatamente non perdere la guerra

- con una caduta del governo (possibile assassinio), ed abbattimento del morale (e del fisico) .. della popolazione con morti e mancanza di cibo, luce elettrica, riscaldamento, medicine (e funionamento ospedali.

- poter continuare a combattere .. poiché se il governo rimane in piedi, .. e con armamenti leggeri (missili terra-aria ed anticarro, droni, fucili, ecc . ) .. porta .. l’esercito russo ad una fase di stallo .. (con complicaioni dell a posizione di Putin in patria e con gli alleati).

(da valutare la presenza di milizie irregolari (crimine di guerra) agli ordini di putin)

«< si tenga conto che tali milizie sono considerate un crimie di guerra

argomenti

SUPERATO ORA DIVIENE ARTICOLO LINKATO AI DUE TABS

COSA è POSSIBILE (E NON è POSSIBILE) FARE (POSSIBILI SOLUZIONI) ▼

◘ Nell’immediato
► il punto generale sulla situazione
La strategia è di non provocare una guerra tra Russia e resto del mondo (NATO), ma .. contenere la situazione sino a che diviene possibile una solozione “politica” (non necessariamente “diplomatica”. (il problema è la minaccia di Putin di ricorrrere alla guerra nuclesare, che potrebbe essere un bluff, ma è rischioso .. verificare).
È necessario comprendere che:
- LA GUERRA NON SI PUÒ VINCERE.
- PUTIN NON SI RITIRERÀ MAI .. non deciderà mai di perdere la guerra (ritirarsi dall’Ukraina) perché perderebbe il suo potere in Russia.
L’unica opzione sembra essere quella di fare in modo che Putin sia finito in Russia …
● perdita di consenso (si sono le elezioni nel 2024)
● sua eliminazione come ha fatto l’Italia con Mussolini (imprigionato) o con Hitler (attentato riuscito solo in parte).
Di conseguenza, tenuto conto che nel frattempo non si vuole scatenare una geurra mondaile, vi sono cose che
non si possono fare
la .. soluzione temporanea è ..
● Impedire la conquista della Capitale Kiev (e l’assassinio del Presidente Zelenskyy ) in modo che rimanga aperta la guerra tra i due Eserciti (che l’Ukraina non capitoli dal punto di vista istituzionale). Per fre ciò:
che é possibile fare:
- inviare armi
- …..