The need to define a “sustainable reconstruction” for Ukraine (Call for a correct restoration of peace in ukraine)


Today we begin to talk about how to rebuild Ukraine (how much money is needed, where will the money be found, how it can be used, etc …).

In this context we are witnessing a series of statements which, to put it mildly, are rather naive, irrational. And them do not allow us to understand how the future can be decidedly more advantageous than we imagine it now.

It is the usual mistake of imagining the future without considering that it, especially in some moments of disruption, is not a linear evolution of the present, but a leap in history in which some fundamental factors change radically. In the case of Russia, the relationship with it in the post-war period will be completely different in the economic field (assuming that one is committed to ending the war correctly).

The new condition of a defeated Russia would, in fact, bring to the West many advantages that it is necessary to begin to take into consideration in defining the ways to end the war, and to establish a condition of real Peace. “The sharp downsizing of post-Putin Russia (Russia will no longer be a problem for the west, but an advantage)“>


For these reasons, it is necessary to begin to reflect on the mistakes made in the past, and on how well founded the current reconstruction strategies for Ukraine are (those that are beginning to be outlined at the end of spring 2022).

Today, for example, it is necessary to reflect on how the idea of being able to create a new stable political balance in the World with the League of Nations (which was not able to prevent WW II), and with the UN and NATO (whom failed to prevent the invasion of Ukraine.) did not work in the past.



In this article we see what the characteristics of a “sustainable reconstruction” of Ukraine can be. That is a process that can not only allow Ukraine to recover the conditions of life before the war, but that can also lead to the definition of a new world political equilibrium in which it is no longer possible for the current great autocracies (for example the China) to illegally expand their power over the rest of the World (to the point of “annexing” other sovereign states).


 The problem is, precisely, that with the post-war projects that are beginning to glimpse, it is clear that we are once again making the mistake of wanting to see immediate results (which bring economic benefits to the States that propose such plans), which however in the long run they can become a serious problem not only for Ukraine, but also for the proponents (for the entire West).

In these plans no consideration is given to that, among other things, that

that Russia must repay the “damage” of the war,
and be condemned for crimes against humanity;
and that a reconstruction of Ukraine should not be an opportunity for the West to exert a strong political influence on it in the future
– to have economic advantages in exchange

 (as we will see, this is not a moral issue: by setting such conditions for the reconstruction of Ukraine, in the long run, the whole West is lost).

How is it possible to define
a “correct” reconstruction
for Ukraine that improves the world political balance?

It is therefore a question in this case of

understand the “how to”
to get out of this war
so that we can establish a better global political balance
than in recent decades

(the current one is in fact a balance which, undermined by some basic defects, led to the escalation of the aggressive policies of Putin’s Russia, which ended into the invasion of Ukraine.)

Which basically means that today it is necessary to clarify what are some key points on which the definition of a correct reconstruction of Ukraine depends.

In order to arrive at a situation of real Peace,

– it is a question of being aware of what a real Peace is <see GCW article “Lack of awareness of what a true condition of Peace is (the illusion of immediate relief)“>

– and also not to forget that the sine qua non for real peace is the fall of Putin (any negotiations must be initiated with a “post-Putin Russia”) <see GCW text “With Putin in power, nothing positive can be done (the Putin’s fall)” in “Post-war: a future with a resized role for Russia”>


More specifically, it is a question of understanding the “question of money” necessary for the reconstruction of Ukraine.

It is not a question of defining anything new: the situation has already occurred several times in history (the current case of Russia, for example, is similar to that of Hitler’s Germany in post WW II).

The key-points to be able to conceive a “sustainable reconstruction” of Ukraine

In order to set up a reconstruction of Ukraine that can guarantee a lasting global peace situation, some fundamental points need to be clarified upstream of everything:

the war was not a question between Russia and Ukraine,
but it was a world “war”
(albeit fought in the “unconventional” mode).

In order to be able to solve the problem effectively – so that it never recurs – it is therefore necessary to begin to consider what the roots of the problem are.

The primary causes of the problem that occurred with the invasion of Ukraine lie in the mistakes made after World War II: the fundamental error seems to be that of having defined a world balance in which the USSR was among the protagonist states. (to which some central European states have been “given away”; and to which a decisive role has been given to the UN).

Another mistake was to create an Alliance, NATO, whose strength was based on the “nuclear deterrent”, which the invasion of Ukraine has shown to be totally ineffective <see GCW text “The fall of the nuclear deterrent taboo: the possibility of defining a deterrent substantially different from the nuclear one“>

And in chronological order, the last mistake was to let Putin rebuild, slowly, but clearly (with an action supported by various proclamations) the Soviet Union (UN, NATO, EU, G7 have not taken no effective measures in the cases of Chechnya, Georgia, Crimea).


the reconstruction of Ukraine
cannot be considered by other nations

This is not a moral question: if you really want to achieve a stable global political equilibrium it is necessary not to commit the mistakes of the past (Afghanistan, Iraq, ..).


The war in Ukraine highlighted how

the various Alliances
responsible for maintaining a global political balance
have been unable to either prevent Russia’s invasion of Ukraine
or stop Russia’s atrocious crimes during the war.

Now it is necessary to reflect on what were the root causes of this problem.


The fact is therefore that one of the major current problems with respect to the possibility of being able to maintain an effective global political balance is the ineffectiveness of organizations such as NATO, UN, G7, EU (organizations on which, among other things, the Courts of Justice depend that today are unable to issue criminal sentences could favor the development of a real condition of Peace in the Russia-Ukraine conflict).

An analysis of the problems of the current Alliances

Trying to analyze the mistakes of the past committed in the use of organizations such as the UN and NATO, the problems that have undermined their strategies emerge. Problems that must be avoided in defining new types of alliances that are more in step with the times.


So what are the characteristics of these organizations that have prevented their effective functioning? Or what are the principles on which new international alliances must be defined?

The current alliances did not work in the case of the attack on Ukraine precisely because they are afflicted by the following problems:

► lack of basic “philosophies” and common organizational criteria among the members

In the case of an alliance that has to defend Western Democracies, it must obviously be based on basic “philosophies” and common organizational criteria linked to the concept of Democracy

That is, among the allies there must be:

a commonality of basic political approaches (ideologies): the basic problem of organizations such as the UN and NATO is to include allies who are in reality those despotisms (dictatorships disguised as democracies) from which they want to defend themselves.

In these international organizations, in fact, the autocratic states are developing projects to extend their power to other nations have decisive executive roles (see: Russia, China, Turkey)

In this situation the “enemies” are able to create deadlock situations in the development of projects to contrast the strategies of extending their power. Situations from which autocratic nations take advantage of: their ideologies justify them if they do not follow the rules, and the inactions of other members allow them to (illegally) gain positions of greater power.

(By inaction by other nations we mean those positions of allies in some way compromised with such autocratic nations, as is the case with Germany in the case of the aggression against Ukraine).

These stalemates have been going on for decades, and in the past allowed Russia to operate freely to illegally annex Chechnya, part of Georgia and Crimea (and allow China to continue to declare with impunity that it wants to “annex” Taiwan).


More specifically, the fatal inefficiencies of these organizations are:

– in the case of the UN, it was unable to accomplish in any way its task of protecting the Ukrainian population by allowing the Russians to continue undeterred to decimate the civilian population, and literally destroy entire cities (the UN was not even able to to offer guarantees for the evacuations of cities bombed by Russians, or to protect shelters – such as the Mariupol theater – and hospitals).

– in the case of NATO – although it was understood that a war was being fought in Ukraine in defense of all of Europe – it was unable to act effectively to stop the Russian attacks.

The same happens with China and Taiwan: a tragedy heralded by the constant proclamations of China.


organizational structure of a democratic type; the most evident manufacturing defect of the UN is in the paradox on which it is based: the desire to defend Democracy without itself being a democratic body (in fact, the majority of the votes of the nations do not count, but only a few great powers – including the autocracies China and Russia – which with their right of veto can block any initiative).

 ► lack of a commonality of strong (vital) interests

Furthermore, for an alliance to function the members must have strong (vital) specific interests in common.

Otherwise there will be members who are not sufficiently committed to developing protection strategies towards autocratic states. And the stalemates will be created that will favor the latter.

A significant example of a state compromised with an autocratic power is that of Germany, where the main interest is to have a privileged gas supply channel with Russia).


The problem of “collaborationist” and “last-minute conversions”

This case of Germany’s relationship with Russia is the classic one of the “collaborationist regimes” (typical is the case of the French government which during WW II was subjected to Nazi Germany).


Germany is precisely an example of collaborationism of the 2000s:

due to strong personal interests in its relationship with Russia, Germany favored the strengthening of Russia both from an economic and an economic point of view before the invasion of Ukraine. military. And following the invasion, he rowed against the interests of Ukraine and (the West).


These collaborationist regimes are real “traitors” of the Alliances, which end up making the strategies of the allies fail (in other words, they contribute to the creation of the problem that the alliance is trying to solve).


In the case of Germany it is important to identify a second problem: that of “last-minute conversions”.

This is the typical case of people or nations that, although for years they have had a collaborative relationship with the “enemy”, when they see that things are going badly for the latter, they decide to go to the other side in order to enjoy the advantage. to be “on the side of the winners”.

These conversions have been seen for example in Italy where after the fall of Mussolini: many fascists have begun to say that they have always been anti-fascists, and thanks to this daring change they have obtained important posts in administrations and universities in the post-war period (we are talking about leading figures such as the “philosopher” Norberto Bobbio, the future Nobel Prize for the theater Dario Fo, renowned journalists such as Giorgio Bocca).


This type of “conversion” seems to be that of Germany which after 3 months of war begins to declare that it wants to lend money to Ukraine (to obtain economic advantages), and to send some aid in armaments (to be able to say, after it did not want to support Ukraine in the phases of the war in which the latter seemed doomed, “we were there too”).

The worst aspect of this fact is Germany’s attempt to profit from the classic debt-trap that China is implementing with the Belt and road Initiative “.

► the problem of the ineffectiveness of international Courts of Justice, and of the nuclear deterrent

The lack of this commonality of interests and founding principles of nations is responsible for the stalemate that occurs today in international Courts of Justice when it comes to convicting Russians who have committed documented crimes against Humanity (such Courts can only instruct investigations that however they remain ends in themselves).

(the current Courts of Justice depend on the UN which cannot allow its members to be sentenced; moreover, the UN prevents its members from creating other Courts not controlled by the Organization).


Another mistake of the policies of defense of the West from the threats of expansion of autocratic states (currently the post-Communist countries) implemented in the post-WW II was that them were based on the concept of “nuclear deterrent”. A deterrent that, among other problems, was unable to do anything to prevent the invasion of a sovereign state like Ukraine.

The problem of the “nuclear deterrent” is that it is located at a purely “theoretical” level, which is in fact impracticable (it is essentially one of the most successful bluffs in the history of international politics) since the use of that type of armament means self-destruction of the attacker.

With the war in Ukraine it seems that, in the era of information technology society, even a totalitarian state like Russia is unable to hide this truth from the population.

<see GCW article “The paradox of a deterrent that implies self-destruction (oltre il deterrente nucleare)”>


The endemic nature of these fatal flaws in current international political alliances means that these institutions cannot be changed: it is therefore necessary to create alternative alliances outside of them. In the next chapter we analyze the characteristics necessary to have effective alliances.

The characteristics of a new type of alliance more effective than the current ones

– – –

Returning to the question of an effective reconstruction of Ukraine, it is necessary to work in a direction that allows for a stable political situation in that nation (taking into account that the stability of a nation bordering Russia is indispensable for having a solid global political balance).

That is, it is necessary not to repeat the mistakes of the past: with the League of Nations, which after its failure to prevent the outbreak of WW II was replaced by the UN, which in turn was unable to prevent this. last war of Russia (and China) against the West.


Taking into consideration the critical factors that led to the failure of the current alliances (in particular NATO and the UN) analyzed above, the new alliances should be based on the following key-points:

the members must be of real Democracies (there must no longer be members like Russia, China and Turkey). [see chapter “lack of basic” philosophies “and common organizational criteria among the members”]

alliances must be based on a community of vital interests (there must be truly committed and reliable nations): there must be no compromised members with the nations against which one is working, such as Germany and Hungary. [see chapter “Lack of a commonality of strong (vital) interests”]

them must be independent alliances from the current ones (see the problems created by having to respect the UN clauses, which prevent members from setting up courts to convict Russian war criminals).

the military strength of the alliance must be based on new types of weapons (War 2.0), and therefore it is necessary to define a new form of deterrence. <see GCW article “The shift in the concept of war and arms“>

Correct relationships with “minor” allies must be defined, avoiding the creation of subordinate relationships such as that of the puppet-state (being aware of the latter type of relationship creates a “weak link” in the alliance that invalidates its effectiveness).

new ways of exiting from conflicts must be defined, which will allow for a solid peace for a long time.

One of these ways is precisely the definition of new ways of restoring optimal living conditions in the attacked countries. The following chapters are dedicated to the case of the “reconstruction” of Ukraine.


Basically in an alliance that works

there must be (really) sovereign states, where this condition does not exist, there is an unreliable member, and the alliance ends up not producing the desired results. [see the previous chapter “The factors underlying a real peace process (and a stable global political balance) – the question of Sovereignty”]

these States must enter into collaboration agreements defined with respect to specific situations

 Each alliance can only be created on a single specific goal (as it is in the case of ending the war in Ukraine). Otherwise it is not possible to have truly committed nations with respect to the predetermined result. Of course, the alliance must not have members compromised with the nations against which it is working (as in the case of the Russia-Ukraine conflict are Germany and Hungary).

In this new mode there will obviously be alliances which, in addition to the primary objective, also have secondary, more general objectives (as in the case of an alliance aimed at resolving the war in Ukraine, in which there may also be agreements between members for strategies aimed at containment of ambitions of illegal “expansion” such as China).

But the fundamental point is that in such alliances when working towards achieving the primary goals, the secondary objectives are basically only a preliminary stage for an eventual definition of new specific alliances. And if two major conflicts are active at that time, only two different alliances with specific objectives with respect to those conflicts can operate effectively.

Again: if in addition to the Russia-Ukraine conflict, a China-Taiwan conflict were to be faced, in order to have truly committed and reliable members, it would be necessary to evaluate the member’s reliability and commitment on a case-by-case basis. The fact is that a member may have strong interests in resolving the Russia-Ukraine conflict, but be less committed to the China-Taiwan conflict (as illustrated in the previous chapter “Lack of underlying ‘philosophies’ and common organizational criteria among the members”, the lack of commitment on the part of a member inevitably generates a stalemate in which autocratic countries are always able to draw important advantages – as was the case for the action of some European states in the war in Ukraine).

For these reasons:

alliances must have a dynamic configuration: members can enter and exit them according to the situation of the moment.

For example, Ukraine, discovering that Germany is rowing against the alliance’s actions because of its interests in the Russian gas supplier, can no longer afford to have Germany as an ally. In this case, Germany could rejoin the alliance if it decided – clearly and reliably – to adhere fully to the alliance’s strategies.

The rule for having a working alliance is that you are a member only as long as you fully adhere to the covenant. Which implies that:

the specific alliance (for example for the intervention in Ukraine) must be well defined by a Pact, or by “contract” (there must not be only general declarations of intent)

It should be noted that in the case of the current war there have not even been any declarations of specific intentions by the coalitions of states that have somehow intervened in the (insufficient) aid of Ukraine. In this case, a sensational mistake was made: a path was undertaken with “partners” of a “company” who did not think of defining a “mission” (as instead, at a much simpler level, they would also have done friends to organize a holiday with friends).

That is, the studies of Psychology show us how human beings, in order to achieve some result, must define this goal in a clear and detailed way. In the absence of such clarification, any “enterprise” of Man will run in circles, without producing any results.

This is the situation of the various international organizations that claim to want a positive end to the war in Ukraine: the members talk a lot, but in the end they do not get any real positive results. This happens precisely because, as demonstrated in the request to Ukraine by the Great Powers to cede some territories to Russia, it has never been clearly defined what kind of peace is to be obtained.

The point is that most Western nations today claim that they want to achieve a Peace which is in reality a submission of Ukraine to Russia (which has nothing to do with the traditional conception of Peace). That is a condition that Ukraine would pose – with Russia continuing to work to militarily destabilize the Ukrainian state.

The sine qua non condition for having truly functioning alliances (political and economic benefits)

Obviously a new type of alliance based on the qualities outlined above

it only works when
there is a substantial (inalienable) benefit to the members.

The fact is that no Great Power will ever move to restore independence from China to Xinjiang (Uyghurs)


In other words,

it all depends on the fact
that achieving the alliance’s goals
brings significant advantages to the members
in helping the attacked country.

In the specific case of the current conflict, the members of the alliance must know that once the neutralization of Russia is achieved, they can benefit (economic, political) from their “investment” in the war.

● The political advantages consist, for example, in the fact that in the post-war period Ukraine – which will in some way be invested with the role that France had in relation to Germany after WW I – will have the role of controller of the economy Russian (at least until Russia compensates for various damages caused by the war).

What Western nations seem not to want to understand is that the “old school” policies with which one tries to have subjugated states (Puppet States), in the end, does not allow for a solid global political balance. While having a “strong” state in Ukraine (which fully recovers its sovereignty, both political and territorial), the whole West can have the guarantee that Russia’s expansionist aims effectively remain under control <see chapter previous “The factors underlying a real peace process (and a stable global political balance) – the question of Sovereignty”>

(obviously, as illustrated elsewhere in this article, Ukraine must in the future be part of alliances with other countries that share its interest in defending itself from Russia, as is the case with the Baltic and Scandinavian countries; and possibly some countries of the Caucasus, which must defend themselves from Serbia, a strong ally of Russia).

The underlying problem lies in the fact that

most Western nations
continue to see the future as an evolution of the present,

and therefore it is unable to understand that in post-wat Russia will no longer be the problem for the West it has been in the last century. That is, it is unable to understand that there will be a post-Putin Russia that will, for a certain period, be subject to the West.

<see GCW text “What changes for the West in relations with Russia if it loses the war (the conditions of a real Peace)”>


economic benefits: from this point of view the members of an alliance that can truly help Ukraine (and consequently obtain economic advantages for the Western world greater than those they have today in dealing with Russia) must know already now that they will enjoy privileged relations with Ukraine (this is something legal, since Ukraine has the right to choose the business partners it wants).

For this reason, if it really wants to defeat Russia,

Ukraine must stop pitying aid during the war,
and must make it clear
what the benefits will be for the nations that will help it effectively

(which did not happen in the first months of the war).

For example, there is talk of economic advantages for other nations as privileged supplies of resources such as wheat and gas <*** see. Article in development “Ukraone adult>

Obviously, Ukraine must put these commitments in writing in contracts with its real allies.


It should be noted that the Ukrainian partners do not have to worry about the compensation of the money they spent in the war, as Russia for some years will be forced to pay these expenses directly to them (for example in the form of free – or almost –  supplies of raw materials. prime) <see GCW article “Post-war: a future with a resized role for Russia“>



Taking note of this situation, Ukraine must be able to make clear what are the advantages that other nations would have from its victory, both for the downsizing of Russia (which is not yet clear to most), and for the possibility of to have supplies the privileged supplies mentioned above.


The fact is that now it is a question of getting out of the war in Ukraine in a “sustainable” way:

a way of recovering Peace that
allows not only Ukraine to resume normal life,
but also to ensure a more stable condition of global Peace

than what existed before this war (as this war has shown, the previous condition of Peace was vitiated by the work of international alliances that are unable to prevent the illegal invasion of a sovereign state).

It is recalled that the new situation of global equilibrium must also take into consideration the plans of the autocratic states to “annex” other sovereign states as is the case with China and Taiwan. Attempt of annexation that could create more serious problems for the West than those created by Russia by invading Ukraine.


In other words, to be able to achieve that condition of global political equilibrium that has not been able to be established in the last 100 years, it is necessary to reflect carefully on some points:

● on how to define conditions of peace and post-war relations between Western nations and the aggressors (Russia and countries that in some way supported it, such as China and Germany) and

on how the reconstruction of Ukraine should be carried out

(the two points are obviously subordinate to the realization of an end to the war in which the Russians withdraw from Ukraine – and Putin loses his position of power, so that we can deal with a post-Putin Russia <see GCW article “With Putin in power, nothing positive can be done (the Putin’s fall)“>).


To have a condition of Peace functional to a stable global political equilibrium, Western nations must avoid falling back into the temptations of the past:

1) avoiding trying to make money on the reconstruction of Ukraine (by intervening with players in its own internal market) and

2) avoiding trying to create a sort of puppet-state of Ukraine.

In this case, the problem is that today some countries (such as Germany) offer Ukraine loans for reconstruction, a way in which a debt-trap is inevitably created (as has been the case for some time with weaker states in the country of EU, as are, for example, Greece and Italy).


What the West must realize is that both of the options mentioned above

 lead to the definition of an unstable political balance between nations, as is always the case when there is a “balance” imposed top-bottom.

This is a “balance” not very dissimilar to what Putin is trying to impose on neighboring nations, even if in this case the strategy is disguised by softer appearances. A balance that in the long run turns out to be dangerously ineffective for the proponents themselves.


This article analyzes the issues relating to the definition of reconstruction of Ukraine which allows, among other things, to define modalities that can finally provide a more stable international political balance.

Some key points of the reconstruction of Ukraine: aid is a duty

In the analysis of the context in which one must intervene to define a Peace in Ukraine, it is first of all necessary to remember that what happened in 2022 in Ukraine is not a question between Russia and Ukraine, but a world war (even if developed in a non- conventional) in which Ukraine fought for the entire West – sacrificing itself in a sense for the sake of other nations.

From this point of view, that is, at the end of this war

the West must consider that intervening for the reconstruction of Ukraine is not doing it a favor, but that it is a due act

If anything, with the reconstruction of Ukraine it is necessary to consider that in order to “do themselves a favor” – obtaining a new stable world political equilibrium – Western states need to intervene by defining processes and methods of alliances different from those used in recent decades.

The importance of defining a case that functions as a precedent for the future

Among other things it is necessary to take into account that

the process by which a Peace in Ukraine is established is a case that can become an important precedent for the developments of the next international policies.

That is, the definition of Peace in Ukraine is a case that must become a reference for defining an arrangement of relations between nations that allows to avoid new abuses such as those implemented by Russia (and in any case allows to intervene quickly and effectively in cases in something like this happens again).

What must be defined is a new way of defending the territories bordering the autocratic states which also serves as a deterrent against new aggressions.

The experience of the conflict in Ukraine has in fact shown how it is possible to effectively resist an army of a “Great Power” like that of Russia in a War 2.0 mode, with light armaments and without the direct intervention of other nations (the modalities used in Ukraine are obviously to be improved, but in this war a new way has been shown that can be used in the future).

The fact is that two fundamental points have emerged in the Russia-Ukraine war: ● the nuclear deterrent no longer works (for autocratic states), and ● today it is possible to implement new military defense strategies based on an “indirect war” by the Great powers, which allow small attacked states to defend themselves effectively (with forms of War 2.0, largely based on light armaments) <see GCW article “The shift in the concept of war and arms“>


Obviously, the new alliances aimed at the defense of Western nations must also be defined in a way that does not allow its members to agree with the potential aggressors as Germany did with Russia for the North Stream.


To be able to define a precedent that serves as a reference for the near future, this war must end correctly (with respect to historical traditions and international law).

This means, among other things,

to punish in a timely manner the perpetrators of this aggression, making them definitively unable to repeat their crimes. And

● to take into account in compensating Ukraine that it has not only unjustly suffered serious damage, but also that it has borne the weight of a war in which the interests of the entire West have been defended.

To achieve this, it is not necessary to invent anything new: it is sufficient to apply international laws already applied previously in cases such as the end of WW I and WW II, and conflicts such as those of Iraq and Serbia.

This naturally applies not only to compensation for the damage caused and the condemnation of guilt: it is also necessary, as has already been said, (1) not to commit again the errors of the Peace of Versailles, which by placing too heavy conditions on the aggressor (Germany) brought to WW II. And (2) not wanting to intervene in Russia’s internal political processes (it simply has to accept the conditions imposed) as has been done (in a failed way) where the “export of democracy” method was applied.

The obtuseness of the position of the West (in the post-war view)

It is important to note that the Peace processes for Ukraine are hampered by those who think they want to take advantage of the opportunity to develop their interests.

The paradoxical aspect of this fact is that these countries penalize their own future due to the fact that, based on a naive vision,

they are unable to see
what benefits they could have
with a proper end to the war.

(that is, an end that puts the interests of Ukraine before those of their nation).

This happens because the majority of the Great Powers make the typical mistake of seeing the future as a linear evolution of the present, without realizing that history shows us that in moments of disruption, there are leaps in the evolution of things that radically change the ways of scenario development.


Specifically, most nations today do not realize that in the case of the defeat of Russia, the relationship of the West with it in the post-war period will be completely different in the economic field.

(assuming that one undertakes to end the war as has always been done, putting the aggressor in the position of having to answer for the damage caused).


In other words, the West does not understand how it should stop thinking that in the future it will have to do with “Putin’s Russia”. And to understand that Russia’s relationship with it will be reversed, since there will be a Russia in a certain way subject to the rest of the world for a number of years.

With a fair peace process

Russia will in fact
be heavily downsized and subjected to strict conditions
(provided for by international rules)
imposed by the West

(how was Germany after WW I)

This means that (for quite a few years, until it has been remedied from war damage) Russia will become a normal “subordinate” supplier (gas, oil) to its customers, and therefore will no longer be able to impose economic conditions. And from a military point of view, Russia will practically be a defenseless state (see how the “nuclear deterrent” substantially fell with the war in Ukraine <see GCW text “The fall of the nuclear deterrent taboo: the possibility of defining a deterrent substantially different from the nuclear one“>).


The new condition of Russia will, in fact,
bring to the West many advantages that it is necessary to begin to take into consideration in defining the ways to end the war, and to establish a condition of real Peace.

See the need for a downsized Russia <see GCW article “The sharp downsizing of post-Putin Russia (Russia will no longer be a problem for the west, but an advantage)“> .


As regards the economic aspect – of the money needed for the reconstruction of Ukraine – it is therefore first of all necessary to understand a key point:

the money for the reconstruction of Ukraine is partly due: it is
● nor loans,
● nor of “profitable investments”



So let’s see the following points in the next chapters:

● The factors underlying a real peace process (and a stable global political balance)

● A truly sustainable reconstruction process

● The factors underlying a real peace process (and a stable global political balance) – the question of Sovereignty

Let’s see what are the factors that can allow us to have a condition of real peace in the future, that is a situation in which there is a stable global equilibrium in which there is no nation capable of exercising power (direct or indirect) over others. Nations.

That is, it is a question of defining a situation in which

not only can Ukraine resume a normal life,
but that the global balance that existed
before the invasion of Russia in February 2022
can also be improved

To arrive at such a situation it is necessary that:

1st – Ukraine regains its sovereignty – its independence – which it had before 2014 (then referendums can eventually be set up to clarify the positions of Dombass and Crimea, but this time in a legal way).

2nd – a proper indemnity and reconstruction process is developed in Ukraine.

And at the same time, as seen in the previous chapter, we redefine the relationship between the West and Russia.


We are talking in the first place of a situation in which each nation is able to maintain its own real sovereignty, something that has not happened in recent decades.

The question of (real) Sovereignty [excursus]

Having real sovereignty
means enjoying real independence
both from the point of view of pure force (armaments) and
from the economic point of view

(for example I means not having a dependence on energy supplies, or on products that are decisive for the quality of life of the country).

The fact is that

the condition of sovereignty of a nation
is either complete,
or a process is generated
in which
a condition of subjection by other nations
is generated.

That is, if a nation renounces even only a part of its Sovereignty, the other nations end up exploiting a condition for expropriate the nation of a further part of its sovereignty.

(it is one of the characteristics of human psychology already described by the ancient Philosophers: a human being who holds even a small power over other human beings tends to give in to the temptation to use it to further increase his power) <see my text “Having even a small amount of power in a system allows you to increase that power” [you can translate using the buttons below]>


This decrease in Sovereignty (political autonomy of the Nation) results in the impossibility for the Government and Parliament of that Nation to take decisions that are primarily aimed at satisfying the needs of their Citizens.

Take into account the nuance inherent in this aspect of international politics: in this case the essential quality of Democracy is nullified, which lies in the fact that it is people who have to decide for themselves (that is, in the fact that decisions are compatible with actual needs of human beings).

For these reasons, with a loss of sovereignty the interests of citizens are replaced by interests that are often “not compatible” with those of human beings.

<see my text “The fundamental criterion of Democracy: there are only matters concerning Citizens“>

Obviously the Rulers insist that Citizens would not be able to make correct decisions about complex problems, but this is not true:

1) the events after 2019 have shown how professional politicians are no more capable of making decisions than citizens (nor are they morally superior to them).

2) Citizens, unlike professional politicians, evolve according to the typical modality of the human being “You learn by making mistakes”: this happens because Citizens live on their skin the problems caused by incorrect political choices, while Politicians, who live in a dimension distant from the actual reality of everyday life, are unable to understand the essence of the problems they cause.

<see my text “The need to dispute the idea that Citizens are unable to govern in their person“>


The fact is that in this case the problem of the lack of independence within a coalition of nations is not local, but global: in this case, in fact

the weakening of the sovereignty of a state makes that state a “weak link” that undermines the effectiveness of international alliances (military and economic).


It should be noted that even a “Great Power” can be the victim of this loss of sovereignty: in fact, we have seen how Germany has agreed to renounce its political independence by placing itself in the hands of Russia for the supply of a product of vital importance such as natural gas (with one of the most sensational corruption cases in the history of the twentieth century).

<see GCW text “Have a position of strength (non-dependence/real sovereignty)”>

It is emphasized that this dependence of the current alliances on autocratic states does not concern only the case of Russia: today the dependence of many nations on China is increasingly strong: see the case of the USA which is dependent on it for vital products such as medicines. and many types of artifacts (restrictive measures enforced by China can literally destroy the US).

– – –

● A truly sustainable reconstruction process

What does a correct process of reconstruction of Ukraine mean?

Among other things it means:

1) a correct recognition of Ukraine’s compensation rights (compensation for material damage to the territory, but also for the “cost” incurred for having fought a war on behalf of the West).

2) the implementation of a reconstruction that does not imply a subsequent dependence of Ukraine on other nations

We also recall that the lack of independence of a member of an international organization from autocratic states weakens the latter, since it makes this organization weak with respect to such states.


It is necessary not to make the mistake that has been made in recent cases of “reconstruction” of nations in the post-war period: unlike such cases (such as Afghanistan, Iraq) here we are dealing with a democracy that was already functioning before the war. And in this case it makes less sense than ever to think in terms of intervening to “export Democracy”..

If you want to argue that Ukraine was one of the countries with the highest corruption rate (it was in fact politically influenced by the US through the Biden family), then it is necessary to ask which is a less corrupt state, as Germany was able to concede to Russia the construction of the North Stream thanks to the corruption of the Prime Minister – a move that has placed all of Europe in dependence on Russia).