Post-cold war: the need to define new methods and strategies to maintain or restore Peace


The conflict in Ukraine has changed the view of things globally, showing that:

the conception of peace that was thought to be solid was in reality an illusory condition, since if it is true that in this condition a sensation of comfort was perceived (for having avoided an armed confrontation), in reality in this way it allowed the opponents (autocratic regimes whose declared purpose is to subdue other states, such as Russia, China and Iran) to develop ever greater power.

That is, the conflict in Ukraine has shown how

methods and institutions
responsible for maintaining a global balance
are afflicted by a basic defect
that has led them to fail in their task.


► in order to access a solid and lasting condition of peace, it is therefore necessary to review methodologies and institutions in charge of maintaining a global peaceful balance.



That is the consequences of the conflict in Ukraine

highlight the need for a substantial change in the vision and structure of Nations at the level of international relations

As highlighted in this article, there are arrangements for agreements between the various Western nations in front of which Russia could hardly have afforded to invade Ukraine.


In essence, what emerges from the Russia-Ukraine conflict is that today

it is necessary to rethink
– and reconfigure from the ground up –
those that have up to now been the relations between nations developed through bodies such as the UN, G7 and NATO.


One of the basic flaws of the current conception of Peace is the reliance of international governmental institutions on the Cold War conception (accepted by all as an inevitable condition, which not only can be avoided, but which is also highly harmful to the West).

The problem is that the Cold War is a condition in which

all is based on the concept of nuclear deterrence:
the threat of an attack by the other party

In a situation of this type there is no real peace condition at all, but there is a condition of “armed peace” based on fear due to the threat of one’s own destruction (which is precisely the deterrent).

The fact is that in this situation the life of a Nation (the Governor and the Population) is conditioned by blackmail: in this condition one is somehow subjected to the opponent, and therefore one is not able to develop the Nation according to its actual needs (in political terms, the Nation effectively loses its Sovereignty).


The problem is that with the Cold War the victory was attributed to the autocratic Regimes, which were thus able to enjoy a condition in which – having obtained a suspension of the possibility of effective reaction by the West – they were able to continue undisturbed to operate precisely on those projects of their domination that the West wanted to stop (autocratic Regimes did it at a level in which they did not want to see for reasons of political opportunity).

It should be noted that this is the classic modality of the truces required by terrorist groups, which accept such pauses only when they need to rebuild their forces, and to gain undisturbed positions of advantage.


In other words, in the peace situation based on the deterrent of nuclear armed intervention, Western nations have ended up choosing a condition of momentary relief in which one pretends not to see how the opponent is using the situation to continue developing his he plans to acquire ever greater power over his opponents.

In Putin’s case, the evidence of episodes (see “annexation” of Chechnya, parts of Georgia, and Crimea) was ignored that should have made it clear that the threat that they ignored at the moment, would actually recur in a more serious way in the future.

The paradox of a deterrent that implies self-destruction (beyond the nuclear deterrent)

So substantially up to now the world equilibrium has been based on the concept of deterrence in which it consists of the formula:

I threaten to use my strength against you
as you show that you are a threat to me.

A condition in which, in fact, obtains advantages only who is more shrewd, more unscrupulous: who knows best how to move in such a situation of tension.

Such is the condition of the countries ruled by leaders with less scruples, whose population – due to disinformation and censorship strategies – does not perceive the threat implicit in the strategies of their leaders (a significant example is that of the Russian people, who seem not to understand that Putin’s threats of a nuclear war is actually a declaration of self-destruction by Russia).


The deterrent is not in itself can be a problem, indeed it may be necessary.

The problem exists
when a tragic solution in which one destroys oneself
is posed as a deterrent.

excursus: the paradox of the nuclear deterrent

This is precisely the paradox on which it has been based for decades:

there was a claim that a threat might work
that is actually a declaration of its own destruction

(the formula is, in essence: if you want to destroy me, I commit suicide).

  The situation is in fact defined with the acronym MAD (Mutual assured destruction), since it consists of a system in which when the first missile is launched, the counterattack of the enemy nuclear missiles is automatically triggered (which is obviously followed by the automatic launch of all own missiles).

(interesting is the scene of Dr Stranlove who tries in vain to convince those in power in the Soviet Union not to react to the atomic bomb dropped by mistake by the USA).


It should be borne in mind that in the world there are more than 10,000 nuclear missiles ready to go, which means at least there would be more than 10,000 explosions equivalent to that of the Chernobyl nuclear power plant, which would create a zeroing of the world population (taking into account that even in those few remote regions not directly hit by nuclear missiles, populations would be wiped out by radiation).


Note how in this case, among other things, the question of installing new missile bases becomes ridiculous (Putin does not want missiles in neighboring regions), since we are already in a condition in which in the event of a nuclear World War the world would be destroyed.

<see external article “List of states with nuclear weapons – Wikipedia“>


The result of this “nuclear deterrent” strategy is that a terror has developed in Western countries which has led to a compulsive reaction of the people involved (the populations, and consequently the political class).

A condition in which we ended up not wanting to see how things actually were, and for decades the autocratic regimes were allowed to develop precisely those projects of world domination that they wanted to stop with the “nuclear deterrent”.

This is the classic condition of the human being in which he is unable to reason as a responsible adult, and does not want to recognize the future evolutions of a problem of the moment (which he prefers not to face), such as those of a disease caused by bad habits. And he consoles himself with ridiculous justifications.

The fall of the nuclear deterrent taboo: the possibility of defining a deterrent substantially different from the nuclear one

Putin’s conflict with Ukraine has shown how the deterrent effect of the threat of nuclear war is no longer an effective deterrence.

Putin in fact broke the taboo of the threat of a nuclear attack when he took that step that everyone thought no one would ever take (precisely because of the opponent’s fear of a nuclear counterattack):


for the first time in history,
threatened to resort to an attack
not for a non-confrontational case on nuclear threats,
but “simply” to gain an advantage
in a traditional military conflict

(he did it in a tangible way: moving to a nuclear missile preparation phase very close to launch).


In this way

1) Putin has shown that the nuclear deterrent is no longer just a question of security (of defense) (as it is a real deterrent, which is a threat of a counterattack in the event that one is attacked by the adversary).

In this case, the threat to use the launch of nuclear missiles was made to support one’s own “pointless” attack (illegal in itself, since it is not justified by any international political or military code).

2) with the defeat of Russia in the first phase of the war it emerged how it is possible to militarily oppose an opponent without the latter feeling entitled to resort to the use of atomic weapons.

This took place in the first phase of the Russia-Ukraine war when, although the whole West was worried about a possible “nuclear” reaction by Putin in the event of support for Ukraine, support was given and Putin did not launch any missile.


Today it is therefore possible
(it is necessary)
to define a deterrent
of substantially different quality
from that of the nuclear attack.

We realize that the risk of a nuclear attack against the West (with strategic missiles) is not completely overcome. Especially as regards the risk of launches of tactical nuclear missiles (those at short range).

see external articles:

– “Manohar Parrikar Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses: on tactical missile vs. strategic missile.“>

– “tactical nuclear weapons | Britannica“>

But what emerged from the war in Ukraine makes us understand how in any case it is necessary to define a new mode of deterrence, like the one illustrated in this article.

A further consideration on deterrence

The problem with the nuclear deterrent issue is that it has worked one way: Western countries, since the end of WW II,

by focusing on the nuclear deterrent to harm autocratic regimes, they have actually allowed them to expand their power.

And this happened in particular

with the creation of the new deterrent that the West has to deal with today: that of the economy & energy

(see the cases of Russia with Germany for gas supply, and that of China with the USA for many strategic products).


Note the situation created by Germany, which having accepted the “pact with the devil” which consists in having a direct supply of gas from Russia, is now in fact forced to finance the Russian army in the war in Ukraine <see external article “Europe must stop funding Vladimir Putin’s war crimes in Ukraine“>


Based on the experience of the Russia-Ukraine conflict, it is therefore necessary to begin to reflect on how from now on to achieve (and maintain) a condition of real Peace it is necessary:

1) find a new form of deterrent (leaving behind the various conceptions relating to the Cold War).

Some new ways of deterrence alternatives to those of nuclear weapons are illustrated below.

2) find new types of alliances and strategies on the ground to stop (from an economic and military point of view) Putin’s aggression against Ukraine (if we do not intervene more decisively, this war can last for years, and definitively exhaust Ukraine).



As regards the use of “force” aimed at maintaining – as a new form of deterrence – a global political balance (and to restore it where it has been compromised) some clarifications are needed:

there are not current armaments
which make it possible to maintain a global peaceful balance

(we are talking about heavy, highly destructive weapons, such as nuclear missiles).

the force of the deterrent is not only in armaments,
but it is in an integration of this level
with another type of “threat”: the economic one.

Carl von Clausewitz’s concept is accepted as valid “War is the continuation of policy with other means.” (frequently misquoted as “… politics by other means”) ‘.

It is significant that Wikipedia emphasizes the importance of understanding the difference between the two terms policy from politics.

Policy is in fact the development of strategies independent of Politics – parliamentary policies – in which interests such as those of specific parties and ideologies are supported, and therefore there is no room for strategies that are concerned with safeguarding the real world. <see Wikipedia “Carl von Clausewitz – Wikipedia“>


See an example of Politics: that of Germany which, despite having declared that it was wrong to sign the North Stream agreements with Putin, now continues to finance Russia in the war in Ukraine (asserting that it cannot find a remedy for the problem, and therefore remaining forever hostage of Putin). <see extenral article “German bosses, unions jointly oppose boycott of Russian gas –“>

This is precisely the case of a Country that will never be able to find a place in alliances that have the purpose of stopping Putin (for this reason the need to create new alliances is illustrated below).


Basically, to extend the classical concept of von Clausewitz, since the war was a “the continuation of policy with other means”,

a recovery of peace
it must be based
on a recovery of the level
of non-military policies.

In other words

like the war in Ukraine
was generated by the ineffectiveness of global policies,
to return to an effective condition of peace
at the international policy level it is necessary
to recover the level of non-military policies

(which still need to be redefined from the ground up).

There is no alternative: without a return to the level of international policies, the conflict will remain active for a long time at the military level, with a total destruction of Ukraine. (Or at least, with a condition of continuous bombing and sabotage that will prevent the Ukraine to resume a normal life, and therefore, in fact, with its end).

The need to innovate the concept of armaments as a deterrent

To analyze the question of the effectiveness of armaments, we must consider the types of armaments and the question of “legitimate defense” on which national and international laws are based.


As far as armaments are concerned, they are essentially of two types:

“heavy” weapons such as nuclear missiles (which are very expensive, and paradoxically are made not to be used), and very sophisticated ships and planes.

The war in Ukraine, in its first phase, showed that a relatively weak state could defeat a great power without the need for heavy weaponry.

Note that Ukraine won the first phase of the war without even having weapons as a defense missile shield (which allowed Russia to bomb Ukraine, razing entire Ukrainian cities to the ground, decimating the population and destroying important military strategic points).


“light” weapons: those that allowed Ukraine to win the first phase of the war (although it had a very limited amount of these weapons available).

The question of legitimate defense

Understanding the meaning of the concept of legitimate defense (the right to defense of the human being) is fundamental to understanding the rights and limits of a nation attacked by an army of another nation.

Analyzing which are the rules universally recognized as valid for human beings (National Laws and Constitutions, Declarations of Human Rights, International Courts of Justice, etc ..) we see that self-defense is recognized as a fundamental right (” natural “) of Man (and closely linked to the Right to Life).

Self-defense is defined as the use of physical force to protect oneself from the attacker.


Some implications of the right to self-defense are:

1) it is legally accepted that one can resort to force to defend one’s own safety.

Wikipedia: “The use of the right of self-defense as a legal justification for the use of force in times of danger is available in many jurisdictions.”


2) the only effective form of self-defense is that which reduces whoever is committing the crime of an unjustified attack to a condition of impotence (i.e. in which the opponent is no longer able to continue in the attack) .



To clarify, let’s see the case in which I am attacked – without proper motivation – by another very dangerous person (say a terrorist), and I have to protect my family who is behind me (otherwise I would have the possibility to solve the problem with escape).

In this case it is obvious that the person who attacks me has no right to hurt my family (with the danger that they will be seriously injured, or fatally), and therefore

being able to exercise my right of self-defense,
I have the full right to
to stop that person’s criminal action.

With regard to the right of self-defense, it is then necessary to consider what the characteristics of this action may be in the light of its basic definition (i.e. consider how a legal self-defense can be implemented while exercising an effective action). These features are:

1) no compulsion to limit yourself to a passive defense: if I am attacked with a knife I cannot limit myself to dodging attacks, because sooner or later he will knock me out.

2) right to escalate the use of force (as long as it is limited to neutralizing the opponent’s offensive potential): if the attacker is using a knife (and there is a risk that he is technically good with that weapon) I do not have to confront him with the same type of weapon (as is the case in sport, where both contenders agree to confront each other in a certain way. Obviously this is not valid in real life, when you can reasonably think that there is a grave danger).

the right to my safety allows me to use any means to stop that person’s action.

This implies that in that case, if I am unable to defend myself effectively, I can exercise my right of self-defense using a gun.

We must consider that if a Policeman were present at the scene he would be forced to shoot that person caught in the act of stabbing me.  <see Wikipedia “Killing of Ma’Khia Bryant“>


This right of self-defense is valid not only for an individual, but also for communities of people as populations living legitimately on a territory (in their Nation).

That is, the characteristics of the right of self-defense in the context of an attacker from outside the nation are the same as those of the single individual:

a People can legitimately defend themselves
without just developing a passive defense:
in the case of self-defense
a People has the right
to resort to any thing
in order to defend their safety.

It should be borne in mind that the laws of democratic countries also provide the possibility for people to defend their property (such as their home).

<see also, on the question of the use of force for defense, my text “An analysis of human factors related to violence events”>

Towards a definition of a level of armaments that do not lead to the development of a new World War

In order to guarantee an effective self-defense to a nation against neighboring autocratic regimes, it is therefore necessary to review the forms of deterrence (since the current ones did not work in the case of the invasion of Ukraine by Russia).

One of the points to be addressed is the development of a new conception of weapons to be deployed as a deterrent.

In this regard, important indications have emerged from the Russia-Ukraine war on how one can operate effectively without providing a pretext for an autocratic Regime to declare a new World War.

That is, a new conception of armaments can take into account:

1. what was successfully used by Ukraine to defeat Russia in the first phase of the war:

use of “light” defense weapons.

training of Ukrainian soldiers on their territory.

attack on Russian soil of installations important for the functioning of the Army.

(This intervention was very limited because the supply of Ukrainian weapons was qualitatively and quantitatively limited. In fact, Ukraine was not provided with defense weapons such as a missile shield which, capable of intercepting Russian bombings, would have avoided the loss of thousands of civilians, and the destruction of some cities).


2. what Ukraine lacked, and which could have led to a definitive defeat of Russia (which instead could have taken a break to regenerate its army).

The problem for Ukraine – which was able to fight very well with a limited amount of small arms – was that it did not have the armaments available that would allow it to counterattack the Russian Army (all it could do was passive defense. local in guerrilla modes: waiting for tanks or helicopters, hoping they would pass right in that area, and attack them with weapons).

While Ukraine should have been able  – to take advantage of the advantage acquired in the first phase of the war – to pass to an effective counterattack phase. This could not happen precisely because it did not have adequate weapons at its disposal that would allow it to strike at great distances the support structures of the Russian Army, and the regenerated Russian troops that repositioned themselves in strategic points (in that way it has become practically useless, due to the inaction of the West, the sacrifice made by the Ukrainian people up to that point).

We take into account that the excellent drones used in the first phase of the war do not have a useful range of action to hit the enemy at great distances.



We remind you that, in any case, a fundamental element for achieving a real victory for Ukraine is operating on a non-military level, reducing the flows of money that are allowing Putin to continue this very expensive war.

The need to review the concept of deterrence (and of the real condition of Peace)

More generally

it is necessary to go beyond the methods and tools used to date to maintain a global political balance

 for they have totally failed the purpose for which they were created (the next chapter is devoted to this question).

The fundamental question is

1) go beyond the concept of nuclear deterrence to maintain peace between the autocratic regimes and the so-called democratic West (a deterrent which, as we have seen, did not work with Putin’s Russia).

2) redefine (recreate) the system of international alliances (which have totally failed in the face of the invasion of Ukraine, and the crimes against humanity committed by Russia)


Two international organizations that have failed in their primary purpose have been the UN and NATO:

UN that has not been able to do anything in the war in Ukraine (despite the fact that all the limits set by it have been greatly exceeded) due to the absolute power held in it, with the right of veto, by the autocratic regimes; And

NATO which was unable to do anything in the war in Ukraine either to prevent invasion or to support the Ukrainian Army in armed clashes (all support came from individual nations).

As mentioned above, the current alliances cannot have any success in the event of a military aggression by Russia, since within it there are countries such as Germany, which are victims of blackmail from Russia due to gas supplies.

It is therefore necessary to develop new alliances (and new methods of intervention) more functional to the current historical phase that act as a deterrent against an armed attack by the autocratic regimes. In the next chapter some possibilities are analyzed.


There are many aspects of the methodologies for maintaining an international political balance that need to be reviewed in the light of the Russia-Ukraine conflict: two of these are the way of evaluating relations with autocratic regimes and issues relating to armed conflicts.

Among the issues that have emerged, the fact that Putin has broken the taboo of the nuclear attack has already been discussed in two aspects:

1) although for decades it was thought that the capability of a nuclear missile attack was a deterrent against a military attack on a Western nation, this turned out not to be true: (Putin did not have any problems invading the Ukraine).

2) it has always been thought that the nuclear deterrent was a card played only to prevent the opponent from arming himself in a strategically superior way.

That is, although it was thought that no one would use the nuclear threat to support an armed invasion of another state, Putin used it for that very purpose, showing how an autocratic regime could be willing to start the destruction of the world (to commit suicide) to carry out their own “political” project.

Obviously, although Putin has broken this taboo, the situation remains highly critical: there remains a clear danger that he will be able to use nuclear weapons if the wrong move is made.

But it is in any case important to record how Putin’s intervention in Ukraine showed how it is actually possible for a “small” State to defeat a “Great power” without direct intervention by allied armies (which could somehow give the attacker the pretext of unleashing a new World War)).


In other words, the novelty shown by the war in Ukraine is that

there is no longer a need for allied nations
to intervene directly in a military confrontation

to support a State victim of aggression.


More specifically, today it is necessary to reflect on how much the fact that in this war the Russian Army was defeated and forced to retreat by an army that was supported only by supplies of “light” defense weapons can be exploited to define new strategies. to maintain a world political balance is possible

Note that not only were these supplies very limited in quantity, but also that the West did not supply Ukraine with vital defense weapons, such as “missile shields” which could have intercepted even 90% of the Russian missiles that they razed some cities to the ground, killing thousands of civilians.

New ways of using weapons (local strategies)

In summary, the experience of the conflict in Ukraine has shown how it is necessary to define (1) a new type of deterrent, (2) new international alliances substantially different from the current ones, and (3) new modalities of armaments and deployment of armed forces.

The first two points are addressed in the previous chapters. As for the new ways of using armaments, in order to maintain a real global political balance, it is a question of

move from global strategies
(such as the deployment of nuclear missiles)
to local strategies
(with defense armaments)


it is possible to defend
the world political equilibrium
protecting each State locally

that has a critical position against one of the world’s autocratic regimes (defense that failed with nuclear deterrent).


However, it is necessary to draw further conclusions from what happened in Ukraine in order to be able to define a strategic plan that will allow us not to commit again the mistakes committed with Ukraine (having allowed Russia to start the invasion).

In other words, it is a question of defining a plan that will make it possible to prevent the invasion of other nations such as those under the threat of Putin (for example the Baltic countries), and Taiwan (by China).

The critical issue of this plan is to be able to identify strategies that use “sustainable” methods and tools (which do not impact the “susceptibility” of the related autocratic regimes up to a new World War).


A new strategy can be set up in two different modes, which allow you to immediately switch from one mode to another in a quick and effective way [more in depth in the next chapter]. It is about:

● a first preventive phase, in which there are International Peacekeeping Forces who act as observers who monitor the possible violation of borders (as we see below, these forces derive from international alliances created ad hoc).

It is crucial to effectively define this preventive phase, which was totally lacking in the Russia-Ukraine conflict.


To maintain the role of exclusive Peacekeeping, this Force does not oppose any armed resistance (this can only happen at a later time, with an immediate superimposition to this Force of another Force with defense functions).

One of the factors that determine the effectiveness of this method is the “diplomatic” presence of representatives of the various nations of the alliance, which would lead to a serious political incident in the event of an attempted border violation.

This type of Force could be a kind of alternative to the OSCE with a border monitoring function.


Although the Force used in this case is not enabled to respond to enemy fire, the system is supported by an important intelligence action (use of spy satellites, information captured in the opponent’s field, etc …) which allow to define a correct alarm level. with respect to the possibility of border violations.


The purpose of the this system is in any case deterrence, and it is therefore necessary that the opponent be informed of what happens in the event of his attack, with the deployment of a force of a completely different type from the one he sees on the ground.


● a second phase of “Peace enforcement”, in which a situation of armed opposition to the invader is rapidly created.

The composition and modality of this Force is more critical to define, since it is necessary to maintain its status of independence from the Nations of the Alliance (in order not to provide the aggressor with the pretext of unleashing a new World War).

The references of already existing cases can be (roughly) the proxy Armies (until now managed to develop the interests of other nations), and the volunteer militias (obviously the soldiers employed in this role can be salaried, although probably indirectly, by the Nations of the Alliance).


In defining the potential and limits of the Force used in the second phase, one can begin to evaluate what has been done in the war in Ukraine: supply of light weapons, training of troops, intelligence, etc.

But in reality it is necessary to do more: for example, the defense nation must have powerful radars and a missile shield to be able to intercept missile attacks (which in Ukraine have destroyed some cities). And armaments that can allow a counterattack – even in enemy territory – in which the various support structures of the enemy Army can be hit.



The changes described here are not just a formal change from the current situation in which organizations such as the UN and NATO are relied upon, which failed in the preventive phase, and continue to fail during the war, despite the evidence of crimes committed by the Russians (it is thought that an organization like the one described here would have most likely been a better deterrent to Putin, since in that case he would have attacked diplomatic representatives of other important nations by attacking Ukraine).



Let’s see in more detail the two phases just described in the next chapters.

A. PREVENTIVE phase (Peacekeeping)

In the new type of preventive phase, atomic missiles no longer count as a deterrent – which, as we have seen in Ukraine, are not needed at all – but we move to a new, more effective method of deterrence.

A modality in which instead of relying on a universal deterrent (the threat of an atomic war, which in the case of Ukraine did not work), the local borders of a nation (its Sovereignty) that is in a critical condition are protected against one of the world’s autocratic regimes (Taiwan, the Baltic countries, etc …)

It is important to note how

in this way, Western states actually protect themselves against the escalation of power of autocratic regimes.


The Peacekeeping phase is based on the concept of pure “deterrent presence”, carried out by a Force that has no military reaction capacity.

This deterrence works better than the deterrence put in place during Putin’s threats of invasion of Ukraine because it:

1) performs an important function of “diplomatic deterrence”: due to the presence of official diplomatic delegations of some of the major Western Powers in the Peacekeeping forces, in the event of an attack these Countries are automatically entitled to intervene more directly than they have made in Ukraine.

It should be borne in mind that in this phase of prevention there is the support of important international jurisprudence organizations such as the Courts of Justice of The Hague (but also probably of Courts created ad hoc by specific alliances, as has already happened in the past).

In the case of Ukraine, these Courts immediately sanctioned the illegality of the Russian Army’s entry into Ukraine (this happened in the early days, before serious evidence of the crimes against Humanity committed by Russia emerged).

 These Courts in fact ordered Russia to abandon the territory of Ukraine, something that did not happen due to a military force that made it apply.


2) but probably the most important deterrence lies in the fact that the country that threatens the invasion is aware of the fact that at the first hint of an attack on the Force employed in the first phase of Peacekeeping, a counterattack force capable of developing much more effective military action than that which was developed against Russia by Ukraine


To understand how this type of deterrent can work, it is necessary to consider that it develops in a new scenario in which:

1) new alliances are defined at multiple levels of participation: (1) some Nations are operational allies; and (2) other support allies who still contribute to the success of the Peacekeeping Force, and in some way  join forces in the event of an attack.

The coalition is defined in a dynamic way: Nations can change their role according to the evolution of the situation – just as other nations can join the alliance at a later time).


2) the Peacekeeping force is perfectly legal from the point of view of international law

As mentioned, it nevertheless acts in synergy with the international Courts of Justice.


3) The Force is made up of government representatives from the various nations of the Alliance, so attacking them would be a bit like attacking the UN or NATO (or directly attacking a diplomatic delegation).



The system is defined in such a way that there is no subjection of the defended Nation, for a few reasons:

1. there are several nations that intervene (in this case there is no monopoly that develops when there is a relationship between the defended country and a single nation).

It should be noted that in this case the well-known strategy of “exporting Democracy” is not developed, since action is taken in cases of already functioning Democracy (which was not, for example, in Iraq or Afghanistan).

This aspect of respecting the independence of the defended Nation also applies to the third phase (not illustrated here), that of the reconstruction of the country.


2. the management of war management, as in the case of Ukraine, is left to the local government. This is also possible because the supported government was previously formed to manage a war (such government can receive advisory support on every action, but basically it is itself that makes strategic decisions).


Peacekeeping forces are obviously clearly distinguishable from an ordinary army (as it is, for example, for UN forces). And obviously they follow a specific training.

Some references may be (partially) the UN Police, UN Truce Supervision Organization (UNTSO). <see external article “UN Police | United Nations Peacekeeping“>

B. peace enforcement phase (military and economic strategies)

Obviously the deterrent effect of the first phase is reinforced by the fact that the opponent knows that if he attacks the country, it ends up encountering very strong military resistance.



The definition of a Force of this type represents many critical aspects, and therefore must be developed taking into account the specific situation in which one is going to intervene.

But in general it is possible to predict, based on what happened in Ukraine, what are the methods of intervention that can be used (without causing a new World War).

Obviously, in order to have an effective military force it is necessary to do much more than what has been done in Ukraine (while avoiding direct intervention by other nations).

That is, you can counterattack the invader:

with supplies of weapons with a higher power than those of which Ukraine was supplied (which allow the Army in question to hit strategic targets even behind enemy lines).

with sanctions: in the era of global capitalism, economic sanctions are of decisive importance.


But the important difference compared to what has been done for Ukraine is that in this case action is taken

with “international” troops, which are probably not part of Allied Nations Armies.

There are many possible ways: one can refer, in part, to those who are the proxy Army and the militias. In this case, however, them are always “certified” (and controlled) forces by international alliances (which probably arise specifically for specific cases).

Furthermore, international Courts of Justice “certify” the right of the attacked State to defend itself against an unjustified attack (as was the case immediately for the invasion of Ukraine by the Hague Court).


with heavier armaments than those made available to Ukraine (but used only to counterattack the enemy (although the invader must also be possible in the rear, where there are always decisive supports).